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Abstract
We propose a design for philanthropic or publicly-funded seeding to allow (near) optimal pro-
vision of a decentralized, self-organizing ecosystem of public goods. The concept extends ideas from
QuadraticVoting to a fundingmechanism for endogenous community formation. Individualsmake
public goods contributions to projects of value to them. The amount received by the project is (pro-
portional to) the square of the sum of the square roots of contributions received. Under the “stan-
dard model” this yields first best public goods provision. Variations can limit the cost, help protect
against collusion and aid coordination. We discuss applications to campaign finance, open source
software ecosystems, news media finance and urban public projects. More broadly, we offer a reso-
lution to the classic liberal-communitarian debate in political philosophy by providing neutral and
non-authoritarian rules that nonetheless support collective organization.
§1 Introduction
In many contexts, a sponsor with capital wishes to stimulate and support the creation of public goods
but is ill-informed about the appropriate goods to create. Thus, such a sponsor may want to delegate
this allocation to a decentralized market process. Examples of these contexts include campaign finance,
funding open source software (such as blockchain communities, public or charitable support for news
media and the funding of intraurban public projects). Recent work on the theory of Quadratic Voting
(henceforth QV; see Posner andWeyl, 2017 for a survey) suggests that near-optimal collective decision-
making may be feasible in practice, but relies on an assumption of a fixed set of communities and public
goods that is inappropriate to this context. In this paper we propose an extension of the logic of QV to
this setting.
The basic problem we address can be seen by comparing two extreme ways of funding such a ecosys-
tem, both of which are problematic. On the one hand, a simple private contributory system famously
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leads to the under-provision of public goods that benefit many people because of the free-rider prob-
lem (Samuelson, 1954). The larger is the number of people the benefit is split amongst, the greater is
the proportional under-provision. Conversely, a system based purely on membership or on some other
one-person-one-vote (1p1v) system cannot reflect how important various goods are to individuals and
will tend to suppress smaller organizations of great value. We aim to create a system that is as flexible and
responsive as the market, but avoids free-rider problems.
Our solution is to modify the funding principle underlying the market to make it nonlinear. In a
standard linear privatemarket, the funding received by a provider is the sumof the contributionsmade by
the funders. In our “Liberal Radical” (LR) mechanism, the funding received by a provider is the square
of the sum of the square roots of the contributions made by the funders. Holding fixed contribution
amounts, funding thus grows with the square of the number of members. However, small contributions
are heavily subsidized (as these are the most likely to be distorted by free-riding incentives) while large
ones are least subsidized, as these are more like private goods. Under the standard selfish, independent,
private values, quasi-linear utility framework, our mechanism leads to the utilitarian optimal provision
of a self-organizing ecosystem of public goods.
While our funding principle may, at first blush, seem strange or abstruse, existing systems such as
matching funds for infrastructure projects, political campaigns, charitable contributions, and other pub-
lic goods aim to capture similar benefits, but do so in a haphazard way. For example, a variety of public
goods are funded through matching programs, whereby an institutional body (a government, corpo-
ration, political party, etc.) matches individual contributions either 1:1 or in some other ratio. For ex-
ample, New York City matches small contributions to campaigns for elected office (city council, mayor,
comptroller, public advocate), matching contributions 6:1 and up to $ 175.Many corporations use similar
rules: one of our employers matches charitable contributions by all full-time employees up to $ 15,000 a
year. Doing so amplifies small contributions, incents more contributions and greater diversity in poten-
tial contributors, and confers a greater degree of influence on individuals in determiningultimate funding
allocations.
Matching programs are not only common in public and charitable funding, but also follow an intu-
itive logic that has built a variety of public policies. Indeed, the very idea of tax deductibility for charitable
contributions is a formof governmentalmatching. Butwhilematching funds share the spirit of our fund-
ing principle, they lack a systematic design, and set the funding ratios and maximums in arbitrary ways.
The LR mechanism can be seen as offering a coherent design that captures their central motivation in a
mechanism that is (approximately) optimal from the perspective of economic theory.
This paper is written in amanner that is unusual today. It combines formal economic andmathemat-
ical logic, detailed practical considerations and extended discussion of the normative political philosophy
around our proposals. We do this in a deliberate attempt to revive a lost tradition of political economy.1
We see formal rules derived from mechanism design, but interpreted through the lens of philosophical
1 Keynes (1924) wrote,
The study of economics does not seem to require any specialized gifts of an unusually high order. Is it not, intellectually
regarded, a very easy subject compared with the higher branches of philosophy or pure science? An easy subject at which few
excel! The paradox finds its explanation, perhaps, in that the master-economist must possess a rare combination of gifts. He
must be mathematician, historian, statesman, philosopher—in some degree. He must understand symbols and speak in words.
He must contemplate the particular in terms of the general and touch abstract and concrete in the same flight of thought. He
must study the present in the light of the past for the purposes of the future. No part of man’s nature or his institutions must lie
entirely outside his regard. He must be purposeful and disinterested in a simultaneous mood; as aloof and incorruptible as an
artist, yet sometimes as near to earth as a politician.
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concerns and designed with an eye towards security and user interface, as offering radical and yet realistic
templates for solutions to large-scale practical problems, as well as novel conceptual possibilities for social
and political life.
We understand that this mixture will be disorienting to many of our readers and that not all parts of
this paper will be interesting or digestible to each audience we aim to reach. We therefore now provide a
roadmap that should help readers determine where to focus their attention.
We begin the paper in §2 by providing more detail on the background and motivation above. This
section covers economic theory in a non-mathematical way that should be broadly accessible. We then
develop a simple but generalmathematicalmodel in §3 of public goodprovision anduse it to illustrate the
failures of both themarket system (Bergstrom et al., 1986) and 1p1v (Bowen, 1943). We then, in §4, describe
LR formally and show mathematically that it leads to optimal public goods provision. We then turn, in
§5, to a variety of variations and extensions that enrich the range of applicability and our understanding
of LR.These three sections are quitemathematical and are likely to be relevant to those withmore formal
training.
Having developed this apparatus, we change gears in §6 to describing a range of applications, with
attention to special characteristics of each case and how LR, despite its somewhat exotic nature, matches
qualitative features of previous solutions while more smoothly covering a wider range of cases and prob-
lems. This section is widely accessible and likely to be of most interest to entrepreneurs and policymakers
interested in applying the ideas.
We conclude the paper on a more abstract and philosophical note. In §7 we argue that while LR
is derived from utilitarian principles, it offers a compelling synthesis of non-utilitarian liberal and com-
munitarian ideals into a philosophy we call Liberal Radicalism, which gives the title of this piece. We
ground this philosophy in the history of liberal ideas and highlight its many precedents. §8 concludes by
discussing directions for future research and implications for the future of governance.
§2 Background
One of the most fundamental problems in political economy is variously known as the “free-rider”, “col-
lective action” or “public goods” problem; we will use the term “public goods”. All these refer to cases
where individuals can or do receive benefits from shared resources and investments that may be more
valuable than the contribution they individually make to those shared resources, which cannot be effi-
ciently priced due to the expense or inefficiency involved in excluding individuals from access. While the
term public goods is sometimes used by economists to refer to a particularly extreme case, we are inter-
ested in a broader set of activities. By “public good" we refer to any activity with increasing returns in
the sense that the socially efficient price to charge for the activity (marginal cost) is significantly below the
average cost of creating the good.
As we illustrate formally in the next section, classical capitalism deals poorly with such activities. Be-
cause each individual, if she acts selfishly, only accounts for the benefits she receives and not the benefits
to all other individuals, funding levels will not scale with the number of individual beneficiaries as would
be desirable.
Because public goods are such an omnipresent concern in modern capitalism, a range of institutions
have emerged to address this problem. The most canonical and perhaps the important is the contempo-
rary democratic nation state. Such states use taxation and voting-based governance systems to determine
howmuch andwhich public goods should be provided. The othermost prevalentmethod for addressing
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public goods is converting them to private goods by imposing technologies (e.g. digital rights manage-
ment for information or walls and fee collectors at parks) that allow individuals to be excluded. The
final mechanism is using moral, cultural, religious or social motives to induce individuals to contribute
to charitable providers of public goods. Some intermediate institutions mix elements of these three ideal
types. One example is a local government with some ability to exclude, which citizens canmove across at
some cost and to which they have some loyalty (and thus often donate their time). Another would be an
exclusive but not-for profit club.
Unfortunately, all of these mechanisms have fairly severe limitations. 1p1v democratic systems (even
when they work appropriately) respond to the will of the majority, not necessarily to what would create
the greatest overall value. They often oppress minorities or are subverted by minorities to avoid such
oppression. They are also extremely costly to set up, rigid anddonot easily adapt to demands for different
andnew levels of organization. Private (usually corporate) exclusion-based efforts are, whilemore flexible,
usually cumbersome and costly to impose, often lack effective feedback mechanisms that ensure they
serve the interests of their members and, perhaps most importantly, inefficiently exclude potential users.
Charitable organizations often are more responsive and flexible than either of the other forms, but rely
on motives that seem to be difficult to closely align reliably with the common good and often instead get
captured by status motivations and parochial, even exclusionary, interests.
Clarke (1971) and Groves (1973), recasting the insights of Vickrey (1961), proposed a solution to this
problem, in the formof a rather complexmechanism for individuals to reveal their preferences over public
goods to a government or other central clearinghouse to overcome the rigidity and inefficiency ofmajority
rule. Unfortunately, this system is extremely fragile to collusion and very risky for participants in a way
that most analysts have concluded makes it impractical (Rothkopf, 2007).
Recently, however, more practical mechanisms have emerged for near-optimal collective decision-
making. Groves and Ledyard (1977) andHylland and Zeckhauser (1979)both suggested aquadraticmech-
anism for determining the level of continuouspublic goods, but theirmethods require either a centralized
iterative process or depend heavily on an unrealistic assumption of complete information. However, the
basic insight of quadratic pricing of collective choices reemerged in Weyl (2012)’s proposal for what he
called “Quadratic Vote Buying”.
In particular, he proposed allowing individuals to buy votes, paying the square of the votes they buy.
He argued, and Lalley andWeyl (2018) rigorously proved, that under standard assumptions (similar to
those we use below) in large populations this leads to approximately optimal decisions on public goods.
A variety of work has extended this idea to arguments for the approximate efficiency of procedures like
this, which are broadly called Quadratic Voting (QV), under a range of other settings and shown they
may be applied well beyond simple, binary votes. Posner andWeyl (2017) survey this work.
However, while QV addresses the inefficiency of standard 1p1v voting systems for a given set of deci-
sions and collectives, it doesn’t solve the problem of flexibility. That is, it does not allow the set of public
goods to emerge from a society organically, and effectively assumes a previously-specified organizational
structure that has to be taken as an assumption or imposed by an authority. In this paperwe try to extend
the ideas around QV to address this limitation.
§3 Model
Consider a society ofN citizens i = 1, . . . N ; we take as an assumption throughout what follows that
we can verifiably distinguish among and identify these citizens, thoughwewill discuss the possibility that
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they may collude (see §5.2 below). We use the term “society” to refer to the set of all participants and the
word “community” to refer to groups that fund a particular public good; however, inmany applications,
the relevant “society” is itself a community within the broader world.
There is a set of potential public goods P , but we do not make any assumption about the nature
of this set (there may be some measure theoretic questions for some cardinalities of the set, but we will
ignore these). In particular, there is no sense in which the set of public goods need be specified externally
or in advance; any citizen may at any time propose a new public good. We denote a typical public good
p ∈ P .
Let V pi (F
p) be the currency-equivalent utility citizen i receives if the funding level of public good p
is F p. We assume all public goods generate independent value to citizens (no interactions across public
goods) and that citizens have quasi-linear utility denominated in units of currency. Our interest here is
in maximization of dollar-equivalent value rather than achieving an equitable distribution of value (we
assume that an equitable distribution of basic resources has been achieved in some other manner, such
as an equal initial distribution of resources). For purposes of simplifying the analysis below, we assume
all functions V pi are concave, smooth and increasing. Absent these assumptions some complications may
arise (as we return to in §5.6) but are sufficiently minor and tangential to the main argument that it is
easier to abstract from them for the moment.
Each citizen i can make contributions to the funding of each public good p out of her personal re-
sources cpi . The total utility of citizen i is then
∑
p
V
p
i (F
p)− cpi − ti
where ti is a tax imposed on individual i. In this framework, different funding mechanisms for public
goods are different formulae for relating {F p}p to {cpi }pi , with any surplus or deficit beingmade up for by
taxes that do not influence behavior. Formally, budget balance requires that
∑
i ti =
∑
p (F
p −∑i cpi )
(taxesmake up for any deficit between individual contributions and total funding levels). Before studying
such mechanisms, however, we consider what social welfare maximization requires. Our analysis here is
the special case of Samuelson’s analysis in the case of quasi-linear utility.
Total social welfare is simply ∑
p
(∑
i
V
p
i (F
p)
)
− F p
by the budget constraint. Let V p (F p) ≡ ∑i V pi (F p) be the total value all individuals derive from the
good. Maximizing this over all weakly positive funding levels {F p}p for all goods, given concavity and
smoothness of the V functions this is equivalent to F p being 0 if V p
′
(0) ≤ 1 or taking on the unique
value satisfying
V p
′
= 1.
That is, the total marginal value derived from the good should equal 1.
We now consider two suboptimal fundingmechanisms. The first, which we refer to as “Capitalism”,
has F p =
∑
i c
p
i and ti = 0. This corresponds to the traditional formula used for charitable giving;
while there are sometimes public matching funds of a small magnitude, these will not greatly change
our conclusions, which closely follow the analysis of Bergstrom et al.. In this case, every citizen i seeks to
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maximize, in determining her contribution to good p
V
p
i
(∑
j
c
p
j
)
− cpi .
This requires (differentiating) that for any citizen imaking a positive contribution to good p that
V
p′
i (F
p) = 1.
That is, the level funding must be such that a single citizen’s marginal value equals 1.
If a large set of citizens benefit significantly from a public good, this will typically lead to severe under-
funding. For example, if all individuals are homogeneous, this is equivalent to V p
′
= N , or setting the
total marginal utility of the good toN times the level it should be at. When citizens have heterogeneous
preferences, matters are even worse, at least from a distributive perspective: only the single citizen who
cares most on the margin about the good has any influence on its provision. Matters are even more pes-
simistic if citizens canmake negative contributions (privatize public goods), as then the lowest valuation
citizen determines the provision level.2
Another system, which we will call “(1p1v) democracy”, has F p satisfy
N ·MedianiV p′i
(
F P
)
= 1,
and funds the goods entirely through taxes. Clearly this does not lead to optimality, as the meanmust be
used in the above formula rather than the median to recover V p
′
= 1, as Bowen (1943) observed.
Public good funding levelswill tend to be higher and probablymore accurate than under Capitalism,
which is likelywhymost developed countries use democraticmechanisms for determining levels of public
goods. However, clearly the median is often a poor approximation for the mean, especially for goods of
value to smaller communities or “entrepreneurial public goods”where a small community has an idea for
a public good that is not widely understood at the time for funding. These may well receive no funding
fromdemocracy; this is an important reasonwhymost small communities are fundedprimarily by charity
or Capitalism rather than 1p1v.
Some improvements arepossible, dependingonhowthe fundingmechanisms are adjusted; asBergstrom
(1979a,b) argued, if there is some reasonable proxy for which individuals will benefit most from a good
and we can tax them for it, 1p1v democracy may yield reasonable outcomes as everyone will then agree
on whether a given good is desirable. But in this begs the question: in this case any consensual mech-
anism will agree. Our goal is to find appropriate funding level without assuming such prior centralized
knowledge.
2 Ackerman and Ayres (2002) suggest a system that sounds superficially different from capitalism but will typically lead
to similar results. They suggest every citizen be compelled to give some fixed amount to public goods (in fact, they suggest
funding this using progressive taxes, but from the efficiency perspective we take here these are basically equivalent). If there is
a constrained set of public goods, this may have some impact in raising overall funding levels, but will not move things much
towards optimality. But if there is a sufficiently rich set of goods, such that each individual has a good that is equivalent to
giving the money back to herself, this yields just the same result as capitalism: every individual uses the money to pay herself
back, unless she has the greatest value for the public good.
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§4 Design and Analysis
Consider the funding mechanism, which we refer to as the Liberal Radical (henceforth LR) mechanism
for reasons we discuss further in our conclusion.
F p =
(∑
i
√
c
p
i
)
2
.
For the moment, assume this is funded by the deficit
∑
p


(∑
i
√
c
p
i
)
2
−
∑
i
ci


being financed by a per-capita tax on each citizen. We also will, for the moment, assume that citizens
ignore their impact on the budget and costs imposed by it. As we will see, whether this is an innocu-
ous assumption or not will depend on context; we discuss this in §4.5 below. However, it is easiest to
understand the logic without worrying about this and in no case do the basic conclusions change funda-
mentally.
4.1 Baseline analysis
Under this assumption, citizen i’s contribution to good pwill be chosen to maximize
V
p
i

(∑
j
√
c
p
j
)2− cpi .
Any positive contribution will thus have to satisfy
2V p
′
i (F
p)
(∑
j
√
c
p
j
)
2
√
c
p
i
= 1↔ V p′i (F p) =
√
c
p
i∑
j
√
c
p
j
by differentiation. Adding this across citizens yields
V p
′
(F p) = 1,
that is, optimality. It is easy to check that the conditions for any positive contribution beingmade are also
optimal (viz. precisely when V p
′
> 1).
4.2 Intuition
This resultmay seem somewhatmagical, though less so for those familiarwith the theory ofQV.Drawing
ona similar logic toQV,however, why thisworksout (andwhy, aswediscuss in §5.4 below, other formulae
would not), becomes clearer.
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First note that the mechanismmust take the form
F p = g
(∑
i
h (cpi )
)
for some functions g and hbecause the mechanism is neutral across citizens and collections of citizens.
All must be treated interchangeably as we care only about aggregate welfare.
Now let’s call Ipi ≡ h (cpi ) citizen i’s influence. We can then define C ≡ h−1 as the cost of influence
for citizens. Our goal is to find a formula where a citizen’s influence is proportional to her marginal value
for the public good. This will only occur if the marginal cost of influence is proportional to the citizen’s
current influence, as the citizen will choose influence at the point where the marginal cost of additional
influence is equal to the marginal benefit of influence (more of the public good). In particular, she will
choose
V
p′
i g
′
= C
′
.
Given that g′ is the same for all citizens, this formula will yield Ipi proportional to V
p′
i if and only if
C ′ is proportional to Ipi . But C
′ is proportional to its argument only for the quadratic function. Thus,
we know thatC must be quadratic and thus h the square root function.
While there is a detailed argument for why g must be the square function, the simplest way to think
about it is that it is just a matter of units. If h is the square root, but both c and F are in dollars, there
must be a square “undoing things” or the mechanism will not be neutral to superficial changes, like de-
nominating the mechanism in a different currency. No additional multiplicative or additive factors turn
out to be relevant, as the coefficients thrown off by the square and the square root cancel each other.
4.3 Properties of the Liberal Radical mechanism
This discussion leads us naturally to a consideration of the properties of the LR mechanism. First note
that it is homogeneous of degree one, in the sense that if a fixed set of citizens are contributing and double
their contributions, this doubles the funding. This is a useful and reassuring property, as it implies that,
among other things:
• Changing currencies makes no difference to the mechanism.
• Groups can gain nothing by splitting or combining projects with the same group of participants.
• It matters little precisely how frequently the mechanism is run, whether donations are aggregated
at the monthly, daily or yearly level, unless the pattern of donations is temporally uneven in an
important way.
Second, considerwhat happens in the case where every contributing citizenmakes an equal contribu-
tion, say of one unit as we vary the number of citizens contributingNc. In this case, the funding received
isN2c . Thus, holding fixed the amount of the contribution, the funding received grows as the square of
the community size. This is also quite intuitive and reassuring, as we saw above that under Capitalism,
there is a factorNc underfunding of goods on the margin. It is thus natural to solve this by multiplying
upward funding by the community size.
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Third, and following from this point, note that a community that splits in half with roughly similar
contribution profiles will receive half the aggregate funding of the total community: both halves will
receive one quarter. This is a clear deterrent against fragmentation and atomization, and is the core reason
why the LR mechanism can solve the public goods problem. However, this feature does not at all imply
that under LR only extremely large communities will form. Different collections of citizens will have
different purposes in using their funds, some in smaller and some in larger groups.
The trade-off between preference heterogeneity and the benefits of scale is well-known to political
economists, for example, from the literature on the optimal size of nations(Alesina and Spolaore, 1997).
LR does not prejudge this optimal size, but unlike Capitalism or 1p1v offers a mechanism that creates
truly neutral incentives among social organization of different sizes. This turns out, however, to require
providing much greater funding for a given contribution profile to larger grouping for the obvious col-
lective action reason (see below): each citizen will tend to contribute less, absent this incentive, to larger
groupings where she receives a smaller share of relevant benefits.
Fourth, note that the mechanism reverts to a standard private good in the case that a single citizen
attempts to use themechanism for her own enrichment. In the case where the overwhelming bulk of con-
tributions come fromone citizen, other contributions to the sumof square roots approximately drop out
andwe are leftwith the square of the square root, which is simply the contribution itself. More broadly, as
we go towards goods that are approximately private, themechanism treats them as approximately private
goods.
Fifth, and really just to summarize, the mechanism provides much greater funding to many small
contributions than to a few large ones. This is not for any reason of equity or distributive justice, though
theremay be good reasons from those perspectives to admire the outcome it delivers. It is instead because
large communities of citizens each receiving only a small benefit tend to be disadvantaged by Capitalism
relative to concentrated interests, a central concern in democratic theory since at leastMadison (1787) and
famously associated with Mancur Olson’s (1965) Logic of Collective Action.
While some of these properties may open such a system to potential collusion or manipulation, as we
will return to in §5.2 below, overall we view them as heartening confirmations that our analysis captures
the intuitive core that a solution to the public goods problem should have.
4.4 User interface
Precisely what the LRmechanismwould “look like” is beyond our scope here,but a brief description of a
possibilitywill hopefully help readers imagine how itmight be feasible. Any citizen could at any time pro-
pose a new organization to be included in the system. Depending on the context, there might be a more
or less extensive process of being approved to be listed in the system by an administrator; this would be
especially important for philanthropically-sponsored version with a limited scope, as the philanthropist
would not want to fund just any project.
Citizens could contribute their funds towards (or possibly against, see§5.3 below) any listed project at
some regular interval, such as monthly. Citizens would be given some (possibly imperfect and delayed,
for security purposes) indication of the total funding level of various projects. This would help citizens
determine both the amount of funding projects would receive if they contributed a bit extra (likely aided
by appropriate visualizations and “calculators”) to a particular project and whether a project has enough
funding to be successful. This will help avoid projects overly fragmenting: given the far greater funding
that a project supported bymany can receive than fragmented ones, there would be far less incentive than
under Capitalism for a thousand projects to proliferate, and even under present Capitalism some amount
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of coordination seems to in practice limit such fragmentation.
As we discuss in §5.2 and 5.6 below, various more detailed features of the system would be needed to
help ensure security and enable coordination among participants. Furthermore, the precise look and feel
of the system requires much more thought and even might affect the formal rules in some way. None
of us are designers so we are far from expert in these questions. We look forward to seeing what specific
designs those more expert in this area come up with.
4.5 Incorporating the deficit
Above we assumed that citizens ignore their impact on the deficit for clarity. We will now see what dif-
ference eliminating this assumption makes. Suppose that citizen i has a shadow value of λi on reducing
the budget deficit; we can think of this as the fraction of the deficit that will be funded by taxing her or,
as we will explore in §5.1 below, the cost to her of reduced funding of other public goods a greater deficit
will require. The aggregate cost of an increased deficit is then Λ ≡ ∑i λi, which may be greater or less
than 1, but we assume it is roughly on that order of magnitude and that each λi is on the order of
1
N
, so
that in a large society no citizen is financing a large share of the deficit.
In this case, citizen i seeks to maximize in her contributions to project p
V
p
i

(∑
j
√
c
p
j
)2− cpi − λi

(∑
i
√
c
p
i
)2
−
∑
i
ci

 .
The associated first-order condition for maximization is
2
[
V
p′
i (F
p)− λi
] (∑
j
√
c
p
j
)
2
√
c
p
i
= 1− λi ↔ V p
′
i (F
p)− λi =
√
c
p
i∑
j
√
c
p
j
(1− λi) .
Aggregating this across all citizens yields
V p
′
(F p)− Λ = 1−
∑
i λi
√
c
p
i∑
i
√
c
p
j
↔ V p′ (F p)− Λ ≈ 1↔ V p′ (F p) ≈ 1 + Λ
where the approximation follows from the fact that λi is of order
1
N
, so that in a large population the
denominator in the square root sum ratio is much larger than the numerator.
This suggests that oncewe account for the deficit, the LRmechanism does not yield efficiency. Instead
it yields underfundingof all public goods by a ratio of1+Λ.How to interpret this conclusion is somewhat
subtle, however, and is somethingwe return to extensively below. For themost part and inmost cases, we
believe this does not fundamentally change our conclusions. We now briefly run through some of these
cases:
1. First consider the case, likely common, in which most of the goods funded by the mechanism only
benefit a relatively small fraction of the community. In this case, there is little or no problem,
because our analysis relies on negative contributions being made by all of the citizens that do not
benefit (the left-hand side of the first-order condition is negative). So long as these are disallowed
(as above), this will drop out most contributions towards Λ and we will obtain a conclusion very
close to the one based on entirely ignoring the financing considerations. See §5.3 below for more
details.
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2. In some cases, we may want to allow for negative contributions because certain “goods” are pub-
lic “bads” for some, such as financing hate speech. Allowing such “shorting” may be undesirable
in some cases, as we discuss in §5.3 below, but assuming we do want to allow it does not immedi-
ately ruin everything. In the natural case when some non-wasteful tax is used to fund the deficit,
Λ = 1. In this case, LR will just lead to V p
′
= 2, which is underfunding of public goods, but not
very severe underfunding and in a manner that is neutral across different goods and thus approxi-
mately optimal (see §5.1 below). This logic also applies to goods that are consumed by a large part
of the population: they will be somewhat underfunded, but not severely. Furthermore, even this
modestly pessimistic conclusion disappears in the case of goods consumed by a small part of the
population if we believe most citizens will not be bothered to make tiny negative contributions
to goods they do not benefit from. Finally, it can be overcome entirely by reducing the cost of
contributions to be proportionally smaller than the amount they influence outcomes.3
3. As we will see in §5.1 below, when there is an external philanthropist funding the subsidies in the
mechanism rather than a tax on the community, these issues essentially disappear. There will be
some underfunding, but this is determined by the constraints of the philanthropist and not by this
financing quirk in the mechanism.
In short, while considering incentives to affect deficits creates some complications and potential de-
viations from perfect optimality, the impact is small and often irrelevant. Therefore, we omitted it from
our analysis above.
§5 Variations and Extensions
The above sketch leavesmany open questions inmany applications. In this sectionwe try to address some
of the most important outstanding questions.
5.1 Budgeted matching funds
In many practical applications, at least in the near-term, the funding for LR is likely to come from phi-
lanthropists or some dedicated government appropriation rather than from unlimited tax revenue. An
advantage of such philanthropic (or dedicated government) funding is that, if most of the participants
do not personally care about the philanthropist’s wealth, it eliminates the issues of financing and worries
about deficits in §4.5 above.4 However, most philanthropists do not have infinite funds and thus can-
not simply agree to finance arbitrarily large deficits. In this subsection we describe a variant on the LR
mechanism that can limit the funding required and some of its benefits.
3 If everyone is perfectly rational, this occurs in the extreme case in which a minuscule contribution affects funding by a
large amount. Wewould not advocate this in practice as the risks of manipulation of such a system seemmuch worse than the
underfunding by a factor of 2.
4 One might worry that citizens, rather than taking this mechanism as stated, will think about the fact that is adjusted
to just exhaust the deficit and thus will consider, when giving an extra dollar, the fact that funds are being subtracted from
other projects they value. However, it can easily be shown that such a concern is equivalent, in the aggregate, to a change in
the parameter. If is chosen to just exhaust the budget, therefore, the extent to which citizens do or do not account for this is
largely immaterial: if they do account for it, a higher can be chosen to exhaust the budget as effectively citizens’ concerns about
the budget reduce the perceived value of .
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Consider the rule
F p = α
(∑
i
√
c
p
i
)
2
+ (1− α)
∑
i
c
p
i .
That is, an α mixture of LR with a 1 − α weight on Capitalism. We call this the Capital-constrained
Liberal Radical (CLR) mechanism.
The first thing to note about it is that for any budget B, α may be adjusted to ensure the budget
is not exceeded. To see this, note that when α → 0 the mechanism is both directly self-financing and,
indirectly, the amount invested in the public good falls for the reasons we have discussed above. Thus,
all deficit can be eliminated by setting α low enough. This ensures that a philanthropist can reliably set a
low level of α and perhaps gradually increase it over time to increase support.
Second, note that no onewould ever choose to contribute outside this system (no one’s contributions
through it are taxed). To see this note that
∂F p
∂c
p
i
= α
∑
j
√
c
p
j√
c
p
i
+ 1− α.
The factor multiplying α is by construction always at least 1, so this always exceeds unity, the marginal
impact of a contributionmade through a separate, capitalist channel. This implies that CLR is consistent
with existing within a broader capitalist society, not just in terms of funding but also in terms of getting
people to “play ball” with the mechanism (what economists call “individual rationality”).
Third, consider equilibrium incentives under CLR. In choosing her contribution to good p, citizen
imaximizes
V
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i
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with associated first-order condition
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 = 1↔ V p′i ≈
√
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α
∑
j
√
c
p
j
↔ V p′ = 1
α
.
The approximation here is based on the population funding the good being large relative to any indi-
vidual, as will be the case for a genuinely public good; for goods supplied to very small communities
or individuals, funding will be greater than implied by this approximation, but this extra funding will
mostly come through the private channel and not be subsidized by the philanthropist and thus should
not be of great concern to her (it would occur through Capitalism in any case).
Thus, the CLR mechanism will lead to underfunding of the good by a factor of 1
α
as compared to
the (rough) underfunding under Capitalism by a factor of the typical size of the benefiting community.
Assuming 1
α
is small relative toM this can dramatically improve funding relative to Capitalism.
Furthermore, subject to the budget constraint, this funding is approximately optimally allocated
across different public goods in the sense of Ramsey (1927) taxation and the important extension to allow
for heterogenous consumers by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976). The basic idea of Atkinson-Stiglitz taxa-
tion is that, when considering commodity taxation, it is optimal to distort the consumption of all goods
equally, so that the marginal rate of substitution across all goods is the same. To see how this works our
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setting, we consider the planner’s problem which is the same as in the baseline set up, but with a new in-
terpretation of the budget constraint. The planner seeks to maximize
∑
i Vi (F
p) subject to the budget
constraint which is simply
∑
p F
p = B. Solving the constrained maximization problem,
∑
i
Vi (F
p)− λ
(∑
p
F p − B
)
,
gives us the result that thatV p
′
= λ, i.e. V p
′
is a constant and thus our above result thatV p
′
= 1
α
suggests
that CLR funding is optimally allocated across goods if α is chosen to just exhaust the budget.
Of course, this ignores the fact that funding different goods differentially may help stimulate more
private contributions, and the fact thatCLRdoes not quite achieveV p
′
= 1
α
as there are also some contri-
butions through the effective Capitalist channel. Atkinson and Stiglitz’s analysis is muchmore careful on
these points and gives (fairly specific) conditions under which equal distortion ratios are nonetheless op-
timal. Verifying conditions, considering all this, when CLR is exactly optimal is an interesting direction
for future research, but beyond our scope here.
Some of the underfunding implied byCLRmay not be entirely undesirable, as it may balance under-
investment in private goods creation created by the distortionary taxes thatwill often be necessary to fund
the mechanism (see §5.5 below) and, as we now discuss, deter collusion.
5.2 Collusion and deterrence
The central vulnerabilities of LR, as with other mechanisms designed based on the assumption of uni-
lateral optimization, ared collusion and fraud. Collusion takes place when multiple agents act in their
mutual interest to the detriment of other participants. Fraud takes place when a single citizen misrepre-
sents herself as many.
Before we turn to potential solutions, it is useful to spell out precisely what these threats are and the
harms they could bring to LR or CLR. Consider, for concreteness, a case of CLR with α = .1. First
suppose one citizen is able to misrepresent herself fraudulently as 20. If she contributes x dollars in the
capacity of each of these citizens, she will pay 20x but her cause (which could just deposit to her bank
account) will receive
.1 · (20√x)2 = 40x.
Thus, on net, she doubles her money. This is a sure arbitrage opportunity and could easily convert LR
into ameans to just line the pockets of the fraudster. Theminimum fraud size required to run this racket
at positive profit is 1
α
.
A perfectly colluding group of citizens could achieve something similar. The colluding group may
all be participants in the mechanism, or they may be partially formed of participants in the mechanism
together with one or more outside observers with an interest in the mechanism’s outcome. Collusion can
either happen “horizontally”, between multiple participants with similar goals, or “vertically”, between
one or more participants in the mechanism and an outside participant (or a participant in a different side
of the mechanism, eg. a potential recipient of a subsidy) that can offer conditional payments (ie. bribes)
to induce the participants to behave in particular ways. Again, if the size of this group is greater than 1
α
and the group can perfectly coordinate, there is no limit (other than the budget) to howmuch it can steal.
However, note that unilateral incentives run quite strongly against this. Consider a colluding group
with 100members each investing $ 1000, which is thus funded at a level of .1 ·1002 ·1000 =$ 1,000,000.
If this cartel divided the spoils equally among its members, the group members would each receive $
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10,000 and thus achieve a net benefit of $ 9000. Now consider what happens if one member decides to
defect and contribute nothing. The funding level is now 992 · 100 =$ 980,100. Thus, the defecting
member would see her pay out fall to $ 9801, but would have saved $ 1000 and thus on net would now
be making $ 801 more than she was before. There is thus very little incentive for any member of the
cartel to actually participate. Unless activity can be carefullymonitored and actual payment levels directly
punished, defection is likely to be very attractive and the cartel is likely to die the death of a thousand cuts.
Simply sharing revenue with participants is not close to being sufficient to sustain collusion.
There is a broader point here. If perfect harmonization of interests is possible, Capitalism leads to
optimal outcomes. LR is intended toovercome such lackofharmonization and falls prey tomanipulation
when it wrongly assumes harmonization is difficult. This is a bit of a paradox: while LR seeks to foster
community direction through its design, in doing so it relies on strong ties of community flowing outside
the design not existing.
The appropriate way of deterring fraud and collusion will depend on the affordances of the system.
First consider fraud,which is the simpler andmore devastatingof the issues. If fraud cannotbe reasonably
controlled, LR simply cannot get off the ground; it will immediately become amoney pump for the first
fraudster to come along. Note, however, that this is true of nearly any system with a democratic flavor:
1p1v can easily be exploited through fraud. The simplest and most clearly necessary solution to fraud is
an effective system of identity verification. Beyond this, relatively small groups giving large contributions
and thus receiving large funding should be audited when possible to determine if fraud has occurred and
large penalties (much larger than the scale of the fraud, to adjust for the chance of detection) should be
imposed on the fraudsters and transferred to other, honest citizens.
Collusion is a subtler and more pernicious problem to root out, and perhaps the greatest challenge
for LR, given the tension between community building and collusion deterrence. In all cases, a modest
value ofα and auditing of small, highly funded groups will help deter tight collusive groups and perhaps
mostly take care of that problem. Yet the best approach to deterring broader collusion will depend on
the nature of the setting: a case in which citizens are friendly and all know each other, as in a small town,
will differ from the case in which participants have low trust for each other and are highly diverse, as in a
blockchain community. We begin by considering this later case and then return to the former.
In a broad-society context, the possibility of collusion can be mitigated technologically. It has for a
long time been understood in the voting systems literature that mitigating vote buying requires a strong
privacy property known as coercion resistance: not only are votes private, but a voter cannot prove to
anyone else who they voted for (or even, ideally, whether or not they voted) even if they wanted to. It
may seem paradoxical that we can improve outcomes in a democracy by reducing participants’ powers in
this way, but such paradoxes arise naturally in tragedy of the commons scenarios: a participant gains the
full benefit from some action (in this case, selling their vote) but only pays a small fraction of the cost
(in this case, the cost imposed to the entire community by a candidate that everyone privately agrees is
suboptimal winning the election because everyone sold their vote).
The lowest-tech solution, and one perhaps even worth considering, is a literal in-person voting sta-
tion. In these stations, anyone can come in with some quantity of cash, and privately distribute the cash
between different bins corresponding to different projects. Individuals would put their contributions
into an envelope before putting it into a bin, so that the size of the contribution could be inferred upon
counting. The anonymized vote can then be calculated, with each voting station returning only the sum
of square roots of contributions, and not the amountsmade by any individual contributor. There could
be one final bin in the voting station that does not correspond to any project, where participants can de-
posit money that would be simply mailed back to them; this ensures that even the total amount that a
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participant spends on contributions would be hidden.
This process would be inefficient, but the coercion resistance property (the inability to prove what
one contributed to or how much one contributed) would be satisfied in a way that regular people could
understand and seewhy it holds. That said, the vision of expandingLR-based tools tomanymore spheres
of life, and not just highly infrequent elections, requires more efficiency than offline voting booths can
practically accomplish, and so a fully electronic alternative would be best. It would also be challenging to
make such a low-tech solution fully dynamic in the way that allows for the best possible coordination as
we discuss in §5.6 below.
Electronic voting systems that can achieve coercion resistance have been developed (Juels et al., 2010),
and similar work has been extended to the setting of quadratic voting (Park and Rivest, 2017). These
schemes typically rely on cryptographic schemes calledmulti-party computation and an assumption that
you can trust some fraction of citizens. They allow voters to generate some form of fake keys or fake votes
that an attacker cannot tell apart from the real thing, but the voting mechanism can. However, these
schemes inevitably have a vulnerability at setup time: if an attacker can bribe certain participants to give
their keys to the attacker before the process even starts, the attacker can then use the keys to vote for the
attacker’s desired candidate. Even if the attacker only “wins the race” 50% of the time, this still gives the
attacker a large influence.
Hence, Juels et al. make a trust assumption. In their words:
We make the assumption that the registration phase proceeds without a corruption of voters.
This assumption is at some level a requirement for a coercion-free election, as an attacker
capable of corrupting and seizing the credentials of a voter in this initial phase can mount a
simulation attack. More precisely, we must make at least one of three assumptions about the
registration phase:
1. Erasure of data from voter interaction with R is compulsory by the voter (e.g., enforced by smart-
cards provided to voters). This prevents an attacker from requesting registration transcript data
after the fact; or
2. The adversary cannot corrupt any players in R
3. Voters become aware of the identity of any corrupted player in R.
A further kind of attack can take place using trusted hardware such as SGX (Software Guard Exten-
sion). An attacker can bribe voters to generate their keys in an SGX enclave, and use a signature from
the enclave to prove that they have done so. This enclave would run code that only allows them to make
messages that correspond to votes for the attacker’s preferred cause, and does not allow them to use decoy
votes or keys (except with the attacker’s permission). This property––the ability to prove that one holds
a cryptographic key encumbered so that it can be used for some purposes and not others–is unique to
trusted hardware. Further, it presents an opportunity for attack against all supposed coercion resistant
voting schemes.
This possibility can be mitigated by a hypothetical cryptographic primitive that represents a “proof
of not being inside trusted hardware”, for example some computation that due tomemory requirements
can be done in traditional hardware but not chips of more limited capacity. Another approach is that
proposed by Juels et al. themselves: an authority issues private keys that are themselves inside trusted
hardware (as they describe it, a smart card), therebyproving that they are not inside other trustedhardware
that has a malevolent use. The smart card may have functionality that outputs the key and immediately
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replaces the key stored in the card with a decoy key, allowing any user, immediately upon receipt of the
card, to ask for this key and store it in some secret location. Adversaries looking to buy the user’s votes,
even if they do so by buying the smart card, would not be able to tell that the decoy key now stored in
the card is illegitimate, but the voting mechanism, which uses multiparty computation to ensure that it
is not vulnerable to any single party, would be able to, and would reject the votes and accept the original
voter’s votes.
In general, these techniques can be carried over to the LR setting. Themain novel difficulty presented
by the LR setting is in revealing the total amount that a user spends on contributions so that their balance
can be subtracted, and allowing the user to perform an operation that consists of “sending money to
themselves” inside the mechanism. If this issue is not sufficiently dealt with, users could pretend they
contributed a larger amount than they contributed.5
Themultiparty computation could, in addition to calculating the square of the sumof square roots of
contributions, also calculate the sumof the contributions, plus a “decoy amount”, from that participant.
It would also ask each participant for a “decoy refund address.” The computation would hold a private
key to a fully privacy-preserving payment system, such as Zcash, and it would generate transactions that
refund the participant their decoy amount and publish them. The computation would also publish the
total contributions plus decoy for each participant, so that these amounts can be subtracted from the
participant’s account.
Other potential schemes for large-scale, relatively low-trust environments are more speculative, but
could hold some benefits based on exploiting and undermining trust required to operate a collusive
scheme. For example, enforcers (either human or bots) operating on behalf of the system might imper-
sonate voters seeking to receive bribes; those offering bribes could them be penalized (though their cause
should not be, as this would open the scheme to attacks by those seeking to defund a good). If coercion
resistance could be achieved, such decoys could be useful even without punishment as the simple act of
offering to accept a bribe and then betraying the briber’s trust would undermine collusion. Decoys could
also impersonate bribers and penalize those accepting the bribes or fail to follow through on the bribe
paying. Amnesties or even rewards could be offered for those who offer evidence proving collusion is
going on and could be financed by fines on those engaging in the collusion. Many schemes like this are
presently used to reasonable effect in law enforcement and can be scaled up and improved by thoughtful
mechanism design, an interesting direction for future research.
In smaller groups where mutual knowledge and trust are much higher, many of these approaches
will be less effective. LR may in any case by less useful and less widely used in those contexts, as social
norms may be enough to ensure reasonable public good provision. But where this is not the case, it
would be important to develop a cultural commitment that collusion by sub-groups constitutes cheating,
just as stealing common resources would constitute cheating. More generally, in cases between small
and large societies, some combination of norms/community enforcement with the formal schemes we
describe above may suffice to address the problems posed by collusion. But, being the largest threat to
LR’s effective operation, only experimentation will tell both how serious these problems are and how
they canmost effectively be overcome.
5 Users can receive a small, eg. 0.001%, “interest rate” on their “decoy” contributions, encouraging everyone to over-
contribute, thereby providing cover for participants that want to hide the fact that their total contributions are large; such
participants could claim they sent large decoy amounts and did so for the interest payments.
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5.3 Negative contributions
Not all public projects bring benefits alone; somemay harm certain citizens by creating negative external-
ities such as pollution or offense such as hate speech. This does not immediately imply we should allow
negative contributions to reflect these harms: some of these negative externalities can be addressed di-
rectly through legislation, there are some dangers of allowing citizens to defund projects they don’t like
and allowing negative contributions opens some tricky issues as we discussed in §4.5 above. However, in
some cases the benefits of allowing the expression of negative externalities will outweigh these concerns
and thus negative contributions will be desirable.
The natural extension of LR to allow this is that citizensmay choose to defund a public good accord-
ing to the same cost structure. That is,
F p =
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±i
√
c
p
i
)2
,
where ±i is positive or negative at the discretion of citizen i. Citizens with V p
′
i ≥ 0 or λi in the cases
where they account for their budget impact will choose the positive sign; those with the opposite will
choose the negative sign.
We already know the first-order condition for positive contributors; let’s consider it for negative con-
tributors (for simplicity we focus on the deficit-ignoring, fully financed case):
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Note that together with the first-order condition for those making positive contributions this can be
summarized as
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and thus aggregates up to
V p
′
(F p) = 1,
as is optimal. This is the sense in which allowing negative contributions is desirable: without allowing
them, there may be negative externalities of a project that are not internalized into its funding.
However, as noted in §4.5 above, it is principally allowing negative contributions that leads to un-
derfunding if citizens consider their impact on the deficit, though as noted in the previous subsection,
some underfunding of this sort may actually be useful to deter collusion. More broadly, negative contri-
butions may be a quite powerful way to deter collusive schemes as they offer a way for any citizen to be a
“vigilante enforcer” against fraud and abuse. The downside of this benefit, however, is obviously that, in
some cases, absolute free speech and other protections may lead us to distrust such vigilantism.
In short, there are a variety of costs and benefits to allowing negative contributions and we suspect
their desirability will vary across contexts.
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5.4 Variations on functional form
One might naturally wonder if the functional form we propose is uniquely optimal. We believe that
it is, up to some quirks.6 We leave a formal proof for future work, but instead here illustrate the point
by considering a class of rules that nests both LR and Capitalism, illustrating a spectrum of potential
solutions.
Consider rules
F p =
(∑
i
(cpi )
1
β
)β
.
Again, we analyze this abstracting from deficits and incentives created by these. To avoid redundancy, we
skip straight to citizen i’s first-order condition:
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A convenient property of this form is that for β > 1, unlike for the exactly β = 1 case, every citizen
with strictly positive V p
′
i will make at least a tiny contribution. Note that as β → 1 however, this rule
approaches Capitalism, while when β → 2 this becomes LR.
Away from these now-familiar cases, it is useful to consider what happens for β ∈ (1, 2) and β ∈
(2,∞). Note that our reasoning above implies that V p′ is in all these cases equated to something of the
form ∑
i h (xi)
h (
∑
i xi)
,
where xi ≡
(
c
p
j
) 1
β and h (x) ≡ xβ−1. Whether this ratio is greater than or less than one is determined
by Jensen’s inequality, which states that the sum of a function applied to numbers is greater (less) than
the function applied to the sum if the function is convex (concave). That is, public goods will be over
(under) funded if the function xβ−1 is convex (concave). Given that β = 2 leads to efficiency and β = 1
leads to the severe underfunding of Capitalism, this should not be too surprising.
Thismight lead one towonder, might notβ ∈ (1, 2) be a superior interpolation betweenCapitalism
and LR compared to our CLR mechanism in §5.1 above? While, as we discuss shortly, this may be a
reasonable idea to experiment with, theory indicates it is an inferior solution. To see why, note that β ∈
(1, 2)does not simply lead tounderfunding, but todifferential underfundingof projectswithmany small
contributors. To see this note that we can rewrite citizen i’s first-order condition as
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Thus the efficiency condition that the aggregate marginal utility equals one obtains except that the trans-
formation x
1
β−1 is applied to it. For β < 2 this is a convex transformation, which will thus exaggerate
6 As Eguia and Xefteris (2018) show, in a sufficiently large population (holding fixed value distributions, any functionwith
a zero first derivative and positive second derivative will behave like QV; this idea should extend to our present context. We
think this is not very meaningful, however, as the appropriate limit is often one where value distributions also change as the
population grows, so that behavior of the function away from zero also matters.
18
large marginal utilities and dampen small ones; it thus systematically leads to the underfunding of goods
with many small beneficiaries and over-funding of goods with a few large beneficiaries.
This seems quite problematic not just from the perspective of efficiency, but also because it would
seem to make small group collusion quite profitable. And from an efficiency perspective it is far worse
than the budget-constrained efficiency we (approximately) obtained in §5.1 above from CLR.
This is not to say that using a function other than quadratic has no purpose, nor that CLR will not
lead to relative over-funding of projects with a few intense supporters. It may in some cases be useful to
replace the square root and square functions with ones that behave more like the absolute value near the
origin andonly becomequadratic further out to avoid large groups engaging in trivial collusionswith very
small amounts ofmoney each. AndCLRdoes relatively overfund goodswith intense supporters, though
only in the sense that it has a (quite unimportant) element of Capitalism built into it. But generally, we
view these other functional forms primarily as a foil that helps us understand LR and the failures of
Capitalism, rather than things we would advocate the use of.
5.5 The Henry George Theorem
Thus far we have been casual about how we would imagine LR being funded: we have imagined money
“falling from the sky” via well-intentioned philanthropists or being collected from citizens at no cost. In
this subsection we take this problem more seriously, though a full solution is beyond the scope of this
paper and is a leading direction for future research.
Before diving in, a bit of background is in order. Our problem of how to finance public goods is a
classic one and our solution follows in the path of a tradition of solutions pioneered by George (1879)
and his most important contemporary academic follower, William Vickrey (1977).7 While very general
and quite abstract, this “Henry George Theorem” has a simple intuition familiar to most people in a
basic case.8
Consider a town that improves its schools. Typically, real estate values in that townwill rise. If people
are sufficiently mobile, all need houses of the same size and tend to value the schools equally, so the real
estate value must rise precisely by the amount that people value the schools. Now suppose this school
improvement is costly. It is only worth making if its value is greater than the cost. Thus, if the improve-
ment is worth making, real estate values should rise in the aggregate by more than the cost of improving
schools. Thus, if this increase in real estate value could be captured as a tax, this tax would more than
finance any improvement to schools that is worth making. A 100% tax on land values thus suffices to
fund any improvement worth making to schools, and the same intuition applies to any local public im-
provement.
While this basic logic was the primary way Henry George himself imagined these ideas and is the
easiest to imagine, Vickrey pointedout that the logicwas bothmuchbroader and, in some sense, narrower
than this. Broader because the logic applies not only to schools or other public facilities, but to anything
that makes the city a more desirable place to live, including neighborhood amenities provided by artists
or restaurants, businesses or public transit that may require subsidies if priced efficiently below cost, the
availability of ride hailing services (again which should efficiently be priced below cost; see Arnott, 1996)
and so forth. Broader too because the principle applies in settings where land is irrelevant. For example,
7 As Arnott (1998) points out, Vickrey was the first to discover the formalHGT, but was last to publish it of the early crop
and thus lost credit for the discovery.
8 Some of the most canonical and one of the more general statements of the HGT are by Stiglitz (1977) and
Arnott and Stiglitz (1979).
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within a cryptocurrency communitywe should expect that the value created by open source projects that
make the community function better will end up accruing (at least in large part) to those that own the
currency or for-profit businesses running on it. It is narrower, however, because precisely for this reason,
it is clearly not only “land” that would need to be taxed, but other “sinks” of value.
Such value sinksmay in principle be quite different than land. For example, imagine aworldwith infi-
nite equally good land. But suppose that every family has its own language and cannot learn the languages
of other families; thus, little trade and cooperation is possible. Now imagine there are five people in the
entire world who have the capacity to translate among people and enable cooperation, but they can only
do this in some localized area and only for a certain number of people, allowing explosive development of
civilization only near their physical vicinity. Naturally cities will form around these individuals and they
will be able to charge nearly the full value of civilization for their services, as they can always threaten to
go and start another civilization elsewhere. In this case, the decreasing return resource to which the value
accrues will be these special individuals rather than land.
At its broadest level of generality, the question is how the subsidies required by increasing returns
to scale activities should be funded. An activity has increasing returns to scale if it can more cheaply be
provided to many people than the sum of the costs of providing it separately to each of these people.
Such activities have a marginal cost that is below their average cost and thus should charge a price that, if
collected, will not cover the costs of creating it in the first place. It will therefore require subsidies. Pure
public goods are a special case, but public transit, vaccines, software and others all have this property that,
if they only charged for the marginal cost of additional uses they would have little chance of covering the
cost of creating them in the first place.
The Henry George Theorem (HGT) gives a general answer to this question. It states that, so long as
the value created by these goods exceeds their cost, which it must if they are worth creating, the financing
necessary to support themmust accrue as rents or profits captured by some declining-returns-to-scale ac-
tivity such as land, some form of fixed capital or amonopoly rent accruing to some agent in the economy.
Therefore, it is always possible to fund optimal provision of public goods based on taxing away the rents
of declining returns.
The question this obviously raises is how the increasing-returns activities that are worth undertaking
can be identified and how the rents associated with the decreasing returns to scale activities can be iden-
tified and taxed without damaging the economy. LR provides a fairly comprehensive answer to the first
question, but does not answer the second one. Nonetheless, examples of decreasing returns goods are not
too difficult to enumerate and there are existing taxes explicitly set up to tax them. Congestion pricing on
heavily trafficked roads, air traffic rights, taxes on land and corporate profits and spectrum policy are all
examples of policies designed to tax decreasing returns activities.
Moreover, amodernmanifestation ofGeorge andVickrey’s ideas suggests a specificway of identifying
decreasing returns activities and their associated rents. Harberger (1965) andmore recentlyWeyl and Zhang
(2018) propose a self-assessed tax on capital with a right of compulsory purchase for any buyer willing to
pay the possessor’s self-assessed price. Because this tax overcomes the monopoly problem of sellers hold-
ing out for higher payments for their assets, it can alleviatemuch of the misallocation of assets, increasing
aggregate wealth, at the same time as it taxes away rents associated with fixed assets. In this sense, it per-
fectly fits the bill on the tax side of theHGT.At the same time, it would play an intriguing role in a society
governed by LR, as the communities funded by LR would likely be the primary payers of the relevant
taxes and thus it would not just serve a funding role, but also a role of allocating assets across communi-
ties, allowing them to compete for scarce resources. In this sense, LRpairedwithHarberger’s tax offers an
intriguing vision of a new society with efficient public goods provision funded by efficiency-enhancing
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taxes.
All that said, a couple of caveats are worth bearing in mind. First, the Harberger tax, while increasing
aggregate value overall, is a tax on investment at least when applied to assets that require some investment
to maintain, create or improve. Posner andWeyl (2018) argue that at optimal rates on most private cap-
ital, the private return on productive investments would be roughly 1
3
of its optimal level. This leads to
underfunding of private goods in much the samemanner as public goods are underfunded when α = 1
3
in §5.1 above. This points towards an interesting equilibrium, a society in which all investments, private
or public, are underfunded by the same ratio (perhaps 3) and thus there is no bias across different scales of
projects. This would be a satisfying resolution to Galbraith (1958) claim that many societies face “public
poverty” amid “private affluence”.
Amore serious concern is that some rents end up accruing not to fixed physical capital but to human
capital or in the relationships among citizens who are nonetheless a small part of the broader society. Our
example above of the five translators is a clear case, as would be any public good that increased global
happiness for all equally in a world with a constant population: these benefits would not affect prices and
would exclusively accrue directly to such citizens.
To the extent this is the case, such rents cannot be captured by any known efficient tax; distortive
income taxes are the only widely accepted method. This may lead to greater under-funding of public
goods and even private capital investment, and relative over-investment in personal capacities on which
rents can freely be earned. Addressing this problem is far beyond the scope of this paper, but we suspect
it would become a leading social concern in an LR society.
5.6 Failures of concavity and dynamic solutions
Above we assumed that all functions V pi were smooth and concave. When they are not this does not
create a significant problem for our analysis, but it does mean that it may be ideal to structure the format
of the mechanism to avoid this causing any problems.
Tomake things concrete, consider the case in which the value derived from a public good is S-shaped
(sinusoidal) and thus unless the good is funded “sufficiently” very little value derives from it, whereas
once it is funded sufficiently the marginal value of funding quickly diminishes. This is a natural structure
for projects with a nearly-fixed budget, like a work of public infrastructure. In this case, citizens will not
be willing to contribute unless they expect others to do so as well.
A natural solution to this problem is what is often called an “assurance contract” and was proposed
by Dybvig and Spatt (1983). The most natural implementation is dynamic, and we suspect this is how
an LR mechanism would operate in practice in any case, but static implementations are also possible.9
Essentially, a window is open for contributions and withdrawals of contributions to the mechanism to
change during a period. Citizens are thus able to contribute without fear that they will be left “exposed”
to the risk that others will not contribute. Given this, every citizen may as well make a reasonable con-
tribution until the relevant threshold has been reached. In the spirit of Tabarrok (1998), an entrepreneur
confident that a good is worth funding can further sweeten the deal by offering citizens a payment if they
agree to temporarily fund the mechanism to avoid any potential even weak coordination problem.10
9 For example, citizens could state a schedule of howmuch theywould like to contribute, conditional on the contributions
of others, or some course approximation thereof, such as a minimum threshold for their contribution. An automated system
could then calculate an equilibrium of these requests.
10 Note, however, that Tabarrok’s suggestion that such a scheme alone, without moving away from Capitalism, is enough
to fund public goods, is basically “wrong”: it is based on a non-generic assumption of precisely infinite derivative in the utility
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This dynamic implementation is very likely to be desirable even if V pi is concave, as the optimal con-
tribution will still depend on others’ contributions. Thus, it makes little practical difference whether
the value functions are concave, except possibly for the chance of a weak cold start problem, which a
Tabarrok-style scheme could address. Similar points apply to cases in which smoothness fails, but given
the uncertainty that is in any case likely to prevail in most cases we do not think such cases are likely to be
generic.
§6 Applications
We discuss several applications of LR in order to illustrate the importance of its many nice features in
practice. We choose these examples not necessarily because they are the most important or pressing, but
because they nicely illustrate the range of cases, across quite distinct domains, where we believe LR can
be useful in the relatively near term.
6.1 Campaign finance
In the US, the regulation of individual and collective contributions to political campaigns has been hotly
debated since the first attempts to regulate campaign finance in the mid-1800s. The 1971 Federal Election
Campaigns Act and subsequent amendments introduced extensive rules and procedures for campaign
funding geared toward balancing transparency and equity with freedom of expression, and established
the Federal Elections Commission (FEC) to regulate the fundraising activities of candidates for public of-
fice. Campaign finance issues frequently make their way to the Supreme Court—and the court’s Citizens
United decision has maintained a steady stream of vigorous opposition since its ruling in 2010.
The proposals for campaign finance reform are manifold. Suggesting modifications to municipal,
state, and federal election law, these proposals range from simple tweaks of existing laws (e.g. capping
contributions, stricter enforcement, restricting contributions from unions and corporations, etc.) to ex-
tensive re-envisioning of electoral systems (e.g. public financing schemes, anonymous capped contribu-
tions, etc.).11 The proposals for reform offer solutions to the core legal and political question: How can
regulatory bodies strike a balance between freedom of expression through contributions to campaigns
for elected office, while restricting the undue influence of special interests?
Themotivatingproblem for campaign finance reform canbe analyzedusing the formal apparatus pre-
sented in previous sections. When un-checked, permissive campaign finance laws such as the ones upheld
in Citizens United are simple capitalistic contributory schemes. As demonstrated above, the Capitalism
mechanism for flexible funding of public goods leads to tyranny of the few who have resources to make
very large contributions. In the campaign finance setting, the failure of a capitalistic mechanism implies
that on the margin, only a single contributor (the largest contributor) has any influence on the margin.
The motivating problem of campaign finance is Capitalism’s vulnerability to tyranny of the rich, espe-
cially when one considers the possibility for quid pro quo corruption. Just as the LRmechanism answers
to this central problem of capitalistic funding, it provides a template for a new proposal for campaign
finance reform.
functions at a single point. Any sinusoidal structure that is smooth will destroy this and lead to arbitrary underfunding,
whatever the “assurance” structure. This is also truewith the literally discontinuous payoff function for generic informational
structures on values (Mailath and Postlewaite, 1990).
11For influential discussions of campaign finance reform, see Ackerman and Ayres (2002) and Lessig (2011).
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The LR mechanism solves the key problem of funding under Capitalism by boosting the contribu-
tions of small donors, thereby effectively diluting the influence of larger ones. Under other Capitalism-
based schemes, individuals able tomake only small contributions have no incentive to contribute, know-
ing that their contributions are just a drop in the bucket. Under LR-based campaign finance, all individ-
uals have incentive to contribute so long as their evaluation of the candidate is positive. This fact also has
good second-order outcomes that are the converse of the quid pro quo corruption under Capitalism—
since all individuals have incentive to contribute, campaigning politicians thus have to give some weight
to every individual in their electorate. Under LR-based campaign finance, fundraising and outreach are
intertwined, leading politicians to engage more thoroughly and deeply with their electorate.
The rationale for moving toward LR in campaign finance in part parallels the rationale behind exist-
ing political matching funds. Public matching funds for campaigns—such as the federal matching fund
for presidential elections12 andmunicipal and state matching funds for legislatures andmayoral races13—
aim to amplify small contributions to campaigns for elected office. Thus, like the LRmechanism,match-
ing funds subsidize small contributions. Yet matching funds systems are highly arbitrary: often they
match contributions up to some level with some multiple, and then nothing beyond this level. How is
this level and the amount of the match chosen? Shouldn’t there be a more gradual taper of matching
commitments? LR gives precisely an optimal mechanism for achieving this.
Furthermore, while the usual rationale behind matching systems, at least as described to the public,
is some pretense of equity, the rationale for an LR-based system does not even rely on an argument from
equity. Indeed, LR is an (approximately) optimalmechanism from an efficiency perspective aswe showed
in §5.1 above. LR for campaign finance is thus joined tomatching funds proposals in spirit, while offering
substantial improvements over these existing proposals in practice.
The efficiency rationale for LR and the fact that it does not tax speech has another important practical
benefit: it would likely pass constitutional muster even under the post-Citizens United state of American
constitutional law. Large contributions are not taxed aswe showed in §5.1. Thus, the system simply boosts
the relative importance of small donors.
Precisely how to apply LR in the context of campaigns would still have some significant subtlety.
Should there continue to be contribution limits until enough funds can be raised to make α reason-
ably high? What should a campaign have to do to be allowed to list in the system? How much should
different candidates be allowed to form “parties” than then disperse funds to their candidates? Should
contributions be public or doubly blind (as in Chile) so that candidates and parties do not know their
own contributors to avoid corruption and collusion? But overall, we believe the structure of LR/CLR
would dramatically simplify the byzantine patchwork of current campaign finance regulations.
6.2 Open source software communities
The open source software movement is based on the principle that code is or should be a public good.
Software is a classic example of an increasing returns activity, as it is nearly costless to copy and apply
broadly, yet has potentially large upfront development costs, especially when the uncertainty of any solu-
tion working out is factored in. Many in the software community view exclusionary capitalist solutions
as wildly inefficient and undesirable, yet democratic or government-driven provision is usually far too hi-
12The federal matching fund for presidential campaigns is financed by a $3 voluntary contribution on income tax returns.
13Asmentioned in the introduction, NewYorkCity’smatching fund policy has led other cities and states to consider similar
procedures. However, several states had publicly financed matching funds deemed unconstitutional by the 2011 Supreme
Court Cases,Arizona Free Enterprise Fund v. Bennett and McComish v. Bennett.
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erarchical and centralized for fast moving technology appreciated primarily at first by a small community
of geeks. This has led to a powerful movement of open source developers; see Benkler (2007) for a classic
exposition of this view.
Yet, as Lanier (2013) argues, in many ways the open source movement has been a failure. It almost
always relies on some level of proprietary corporate backing or directed, hierarchical government support,
and even then almost all contributors tend tobe geekymen fromprivilegedbackgrounds, as others cannot
afford to give their time away in this manner. Many if not most of the benefits of such systems have
increasingly been captured by “central nodes” or what Lanier calls “siren servers” such as Google and
Facebook, and the systems do not seem to serve the broad public well.
Open source communities are increasingly trying to address these limitations andprovide funding for
public goodsprovision throughopen sourcedevelopment througha variety ofmethods. Twoparticularly
popular recent examples are cryptocurrencies and crowdfunding.
The crowdfunding solution is that developers can post projects and solicit voluntary contributions,
sometimes in exchange for a token related to the project or other small consideration. While such ap-
proaches have had some success, they ultimately push the problem of charitable funding in Capitalism
back just one layer, onto those who are supposed to contribute without any prospect of a commensurate
return on the marginal contributions they make. Thus, instead of the open source developers directly
donating their time, here crowd funders may also jump in. Ultimately, though, the problems are very
similar.
Blockchain-based development communities, such as Ethereum and Zcash, have taken a quite differ-
ent approach. They are based around currencies intended to represent the value of the ecosystem and a
significant part of this currency is reserved by foundations associated to each community that intend to
make grants to support public goods within the community. Furthermore, several communitymembers
who have grown personally wealthy through the bubbles created by speculation on the success of these
technologies have a philanthropic, and possibly also speculative, interest in seeing the communities thrive
and are thus willing to contribute to this out of their personal holdings. At present, this primarily occurs
through a reasonably centralized process of grant-making by leaders who hold formal and informal au-
thority within these foundations. However, such a hierarchical structure seems both poorly attuned to
the needs of the communities and, perhaps more importantly, antithetical to the principles of decentral-
ized authority on which they were founded.
The LR mechanism seems a good fit to address both sets of problems and for the culture of the
relevant communities. For crowd-funding, it is easy to imagine a philanthropist, such as one of the leaders
of the technology industry who has grown rich off the value created on the internet, sponsoring a crowd-
funding website that uses CLR to support crowd-funded open source projects. Many such leaders want
to “give back” but don’t always feel qualified or do not have the bandwidth to go around giving out
grants. CLR in a crowd-funding setting seems a natural remedy.
The fit is even clearer within blockchain communities. These communities are awash in funds given
the hundreds of billions of dollars resting in cryptocurrency market capitalizations, a large percentage
of which is held by foundations or wealthy individuals strongly committed to the principle of decen-
tralizing power and interested in contributing towards stimulating public goods provision within the
communities. We suspect that such environments will be the first domain of practical application of the
LRmechanism.
Yet even more exciting is the prospect of new blockchain communities, whether currencies, token-
based communities or other internal projects, that are built upon LR principles, coupled with relevant
tax supports. Such communities could act as an exciting testing ground for the LRmechanism and could
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organically grow if the logic of the HGT works to set off explosive growth by funding relevant public
goods whose value is then recycled by taxation into further such activities.
The largest practical impediment to achieving this is the anonymity and pseudonimity that is so per-
vasive within such communities. Clearly, LR relies heavily on separate human identities and can easily
be exploited if identities can be replicated. Whether these difficulties can be overcome is an interesting
question that experimentation and technological advances for identity solutions will reveal.
6.3 News media finance
The production of news is perhaps the perfect application for the LR mechanism. On the one hand,
(especially high-quality, investigative) news is perhaps the clearest example of a public good. It can be
costly to create, but it is essentially impossible to exclude anyone from consuming it beyond a very tiny
windowof time and thus it is very difficult to earn valuewithouthighly costly andwastefulmechanismsof
exclusion. This problem has become increasingly acute with the rise of information and communications
technology, leading to an increasing sense of crisis in the funding of news, which some have even labeled
as “existential” (Foer, 2017).
Yet news is also often relevant to a very broad community, making purely charitable funding difficult
to pull off. This creates a strong desire for public funding and is the reason that governments all over the
world are involved in news production. However, the drawbacks of government involvement in news
creation could hardly bemore evident, given the central role ofmedia in holding governments to account.
LRoffers a potentially appealing resolution. Governments andphilanthropists interested in support-
ing high-quality news without exerting or being seen to exert undue influence over content could use
CLR to effectively match donations to news creators in much the way that they already match contribu-
tions to organizations like National Public Radio in the United States. Using CLR rather than standard
matching would create much greater efficiency and require far less targeted and discretionary applica-
tions of funds, instead allowing a truly diverse ecosystem of potentially new and innovative news outlets
to flourish.
Given the ways in which the technology of news creation and distribution is changing, an exclusive
focus on long-establishedoutlets that currently receivematching funds seemsmisplaced, yet governments
and philanthropists are struggling to distinguish which new initiatives are worthy of support without
tipping the scales towards outlets that support their interests. CLRseems a perfectmatch for this problem
and, given the prevalence of contributions towards public broadcasting, wouldbe largely familiar tomany
potential contributors. In this area it is not even hard to imagine democratic governments voting to
raise additional tax revenues to support such an initiative, especially at local levels of government where
investigative journalism by local news sources has been particularly hard hit.
Yet while news is a leading example where governments and philanthropists want to and do use
matching funds to support a more “market-driven” approach to giving away money, it is far from the
only such domain. Tax deductibility of charitable contributions is essentially a match, and many corpo-
rations further match charitable contributions by their employees.
Many philanthropists provide matches to favorite charities andmany are seeking more creative ways
to harness decentralized or information outside the philanthropist’s whims to give away money; witness
the “open philanthropy” and “effective altruism” movements. Across a wide range of domains, from
funding educational start-ups to large scale interventions in developing countries, CLRholds potential to
provide more accurate and less hierarchical signals for directing charitable funds. This seems increasingly
relevant as backlash continues to grow against the top-down dictates of well-intentioned but ultimately
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elitist class of donors (Easterly, 2007; Giriharadas, 2018).
6.4 Municipal projects and public works
While urbanists have long recognized the importance of community-level decision-making in cities, cities
often lackmechanisms that allow goods valued in communities to emerge. LR, as applied to urban public
funding decisions, could allow communities at all scales to fund projects that would struggle to get fund-
ingunder centralized systems. Agrowingbodyof evidence suggests that policies emphasizing community
values and diversity generatemajor improvements in city life. The city is thus lushwith opportunities for
economic prosperity, if small communities are able to flourish.
But city councils and other municipal governments struggle to meet the needs of subcommunities.
Even though they aredemocratic systems intended to represent thewill of a constituency, theneedsof very
small groups cannot be heard for reasons we have discussed. Some public goods are intensely important
to a select few, for example a small group of households clustered in a few city blocks. And yet, the systems
in place for communicating those needs and receiving the adequate funding are highly inefficient. First,
a councilmember representing those few city blocks must understand the importance of the public good
to this fraction of her constituency in order to propose its funding to the council. Then, funding for that
good is put to a council vote. That localized public good will fail to get funding when put to a city-wide
vote, because the city councilmember representing that block will only get one vote when the council
goes to vote.
It is clear that 1p1v does badly for fundingmunicipal projects valued by a select few, and capitalist con-
tributory schemes do little better. Artistic and cultural community centers—no doubt public goods that
allow cities to thrive—rely heavily on private donors. Some artistic and cultural centers have no trouble
getting funded through capitalist contributory schemes in cities, due to the recognition and signaling that
comes with a donation to a famous public space, such as the flagship branch of the New York Public Li-
brary inBryantPark (renamed the StephenA. Schwarzman library in 2008). Fewwillmake contributions,
but it’s unlikely that the famed branch will soon struggle to keep the lights on. In contrast, the smaller
local Macomb’s Bridge branch on 152nd street in Harlem, survived as a 685-square-foot studio apartment
with a maximum occupancy of 25 from its founding in 1955 until finally getting a long overdue upgrade
in 2017.14
Themerits of LR as applied to city planning align nicely with the ideas advanced by some of themost
prominent modern urban theorists. Activist and intellectual Jane Jacobs (1961) famously condemned the
urban planning ethos of her time, exemplified by Robert Moses’s aggressive urban renewal policies. She
argued that rationalist urban planners do a poor job serving the needs of actual city-dwellers, undoing the
sense of community thatmakes peoplemove to cities in the first place through their top-down, deductive
approach to allocation anddecision-making. She argued for theneed fordiversity andcommunity in cities
by tracing the economic benefits from their sources to their higher order consequences.
Florida (2002, 2008) brings compelling evidence and a contemporary perspective to theories shaped
by Jacobs’ work. His theory posits an emergent “creative class” of city-dwellers, whose diversity promotes
the economic prosperity of the cities they call home. The creative class includes scientists, engineers and
researchers as well as musical, visual and literary artists and others “whose economic function is to create
new ideas, new technology or new creative content” (Florida, 2002). Florida argues that these individuals
pursue a diverse set of creative activities and are attracted by groups of like-minded creatives who share
14Find a press release detailing the history of theMacomb’s Bridge Branch here.
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their interests, such as vibrant informal music scenes, skate parks, outdoors activities, hip art venues and
coffee shop culture.
Most of these goods are difficult or impossible for city-level officials to provide or even foster in a
timely manner as many of the creative class have little access to or interest in the formal levers of power
and are fragmented and diverse in their interests. Economic development, Florida and Jacob agree, re-
quires community-level decision-making in urban planning because a centralized rationalist perspective
will never confer on cities the kind of diversity that makes them hum.
The city is a fertile site for application of LR, and these applications are among the most promising
in terms of feasibility of self-funding. If LR were applied to funding allocations for municipal projects
and public works in cities, the system would have a good chance of funding itself by the logic of the
HGT discussed in §5.5. Vickrey (1977) himself observed that the logic of the HGT applies to any public
good that makes a city more appealing, community level or broader. By the logic long-held by political
economists and urban theorists alike, the sorts of goods that would get funded under LR are the very
goods that would create increasing returns.
§7 Discussion
In addition to its practical applications, the framework developed in the preceding sections provides a
lucid illustration and a potential resolution of a key tension in liberal political thought. The so-called
“communitarian” critiques of liberalism come in various stripes, but all stem from the view that liberalism
over-emphasizes the individual at the expense of community. We argue that the LR mechanism, as we
have presented it in previous sections, offers a blueprint for a new variant of liberalism that furnishes a
novel answer to entrenched communitarian critiques. We call this variant Liberal Radicalism and also
refer to it by the initials LR where it does not cause confusion.
7.1 The liberal dream
Liberalism is a word we use often in this paper and it carries many meanings to many people. Our in-
tention is to refer to a broad political theory, closely associated with the tradition of the Enlightenment.
That tradition opposes arbitrary or historically-derived centralized authority. It favors—to themaximum
extent consistent with social order—social systems that are neutral across reasonable competing concep-
tions of the good life held by individual citizens.
We can thus formulate the commitments of liberalism—as we conceive of it here—in terms of two
fundamental desiderata:
D1. Facilitation of individuals’ pursuit of reasonable conceptions of the good.
D2. Neutrality across reasonable conceptions of the good.
Liberal societies, aim to set up policies and institutions that achieveD1 andD2, as long as those institu-
tions can be reconciled with social order.
Of course these two desiderata on their own leave many ethical, political, and epistemological ques-
tions open for debate. What constitutes a reasonable conception of how to live? With what degree of
social order mustD1 andD2 be compatible? How does one judge whether satisfactory social order has
been achieved? What sorts of social institutions most successfully achieveD1 andD2? Answering these
and related questions has kept several centuries of liberal theorists busy. For the present discussion, which
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focuses on the central tensions in the very foundations of liberal thought and yet is extremely brief, can-
not provide anything like a complete resolution. For the presentmoment, we roughly view “social order”
as a feasible and sustainable set of arrangements (one that does not undermine itself) and as to institu-
tions, we leave them at the level of abstraction of the mechanisms we described paired with some of the
user interface and security considerations we highlighted.
One key issue we omit is questions of distributive justice. We skirt distributive issues here for several
reasons. First, in the liberal-communitarian debate, distributive issues play out on particularly swampy
terrain. Liberals and communitarians both espouse ideas anywhere along the distributive spectrum,
based in egalitarian or hierarchical distributive principles, or in principles somewhere in between. There
are “libertarians” and “left liberals” who agree on liberal principles but sharply diverge on distributive
issues, and there are hierarchical traditionalist communitarians as well as contemporary multiculturalist
egalitarian communitarians.
Furthermore, lack of clarity on distributive issues squares with our formal analysis in the preceding
sections and our philosophical analysis in the present section are both entirely indifferent to distributive
issues. While certain aspects of LRmay be more or less appealing to egalitarians or those favoring hierar-
chical societies,15 the theory allows for the consideration of how orwhat tomaximize (equality? of what?)
to be settled separately from the foundational issues discussed here. Our use of the Kaldor-Hicks welfare
standard allows for this separation of distributive and foundational issues—as this standard is capacious
enough to allow for non-utilitarian maximization.
7.2 The Basic Communitarian Critique
From its foundations in Enlightenment thinking to its successes guiding the French and American Rev-
olutions, liberalism has been forced to contend with the problem of collective organization. How can a
government, committed to ensuring that individuals have the ability to pursue their own conceptions of
the good, sustain collective organization of any sort? We call this problem for liberalism the Basic Com-
munitarian Critique:
Basic Communitarian Critique: A state cannot sustain the communities valued by individ-
uals while remaining neutral among their competing conceptions of the good life.
This critique suggests a major blind spot in the foundations of liberalism. Sometimes, individual
conceptions of the good impart value on various forms of community. However, liberalism’s focus on
the individual and on neutrality makes it difficult for those communities to thrive. This criticism can
be framed in terms of the desiderata outlined above: D1 andD2 on their own may undermine commu-
nity. And if the community is valued by individuals, then liberalism fails on its own terms. So, the Basic
Communitarian Critique suggests adding another desideratum to the table:
D3. Fostering of communiy.
The liberal-communitarian debate, stemming from the Basic CommunitarianCritique’s attention to
this blind spot of liberalism’smost fundamental desiderata, has been around as long as liberalism itself. In
someways, the development of liberalism—in politics and philosophy—can be understood as a sequence
15For example, as mentioned in §4.3, egalitarians may find LR attractive in part because it allows greater funding to be
allocated to goods that levy many smaller contributions than to goods that manage to receive a few large contributions.
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of proposals for new ways of resolving practical and theoretical communitarian worries, while holding
fast to liberal ideals.
The earliest and simplest communitarian critique was that of Hobbes (1651), who argued that indi-
viduals unchecked by central authority would make life “solitary, brutish and short.” A central found-
ing document of modern liberalism was Locke (1689)’s argument that popular sovereignty could address
Hobbes’s critique in a manner consistent with the three fundamental desiderata (D1, D2, D3) outlined
thus far. Locke argued that the best way to allow for necessary collective organization within liberalism
was to set up a government by and for the people. In order for the state to protect basic rights and ad-
judicate between competing demands, it ought to set up a government that in some manner reflects the
desires of the governed. In the era following the American and French revolutions, the new states sought
the ideal form of democracy that would maintain these desiderata, as can be seen by the slogans of “lib-
erty” and “fraternity” of the time.16
A range of proposals for liberal democratic systems emerged in the era following the revolutions in
the U.S. and France. And yet, the conversations surrounding these proposals made clear the tensions be-
tween liberalism and democracy. In the U.S., for example, the protection of minority rights was a domi-
nant theme at the Constitutional Convention. While democratic governance addressed a basic commu-
nitarian issue with liberalism—how is any collective organization possible without a non-neutral central
authority—majoritarian rule opens the door for the suppression of minority interests and thus a bias
towards majority ways of living.
Indeed, Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America (1835–1840), the culmination of his visit to
the U.S., he remarked upon the myriad ways in which democracy and liberalism were out of sync in
the fledgling nation. Liberalism, democracy and minority protection seemed to Tocqueville difficult to
achieve all at once. Tocqueville’s description of the importance of New England townships—small com-
munities that exemplified the ability of individuals to thrivewithin a collective—summarizes the tensions
he observed. It is in the township, he wrote,
that the force of free peoples resides. The institutions of a township are to freedomwhat primary
schools are to science. They put it within the reach of the people. . . Without the institutions
of a township a nation can give itself a free government, but it does not have the spirit of
freedom. Fleeting passions, the interests of a moment, the chance of circumstances can give it
the external forms of independence; but despotism suppressed in the intellectual interior of
the social body reappears sooner or later on the surface.
Tocqueville saw in the townships both the importance and the fragility of the simultaneous satisfaction
of the three fundamental desiderata,D1,D2 andD3. Townshipswere critical to sustaining liberty, and yet
endangered both by individualism and by national or even state majority rule, which could easily under-
mine and defund them. Our formal analysis of the public goods problemneatly summarizes this tension.
In so doing, it allows us to make a novel intervention in the liberal-communitarian debate: formalized
problems suggest formal solutions.
Recall from§3 the suboptimal fundingmechanismwhichwe calledCapitalism. UnderCapitalism, in-
dividuals contribute to the public good according to howmuch they value it. This mechanism illustrates
the problem with liberalism in its purest form, and substantiates the Basic Communitarian Critique.
The Capitalist mechanism allows for the funding of a public good to operate exactly like the funding
of a private good. This system is procedurally neutral across individuals’ competing conceptions of the
16As noted above, we abstract here from questions of “equality”.
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good because it confers on individuals the freedom to contribute however much they can to goods that
they value. The procedure for funding public goods, according to the capitalist mechanism, theoretically
allows individuals to express via their contributions exactly howmuch they value the good in question.
Because the level of funding of a public good cannot scalewith the number of individualswhobenefit
from the good, themechanism leads to severe underfunding. Thus, as the Basic CommunitarianCritique
goes, there is a bias against funding goods thatmay be valued bymore than one person. Underfunding in
the capitalist mechanism leads to fractionalization—as individuals find themselves unable to enjoy goods
of value to groups, they are left to place greater weight on goods valued only to themselves.
7.3 The Multiculturalist Critique
How does democratic governance respond to—and fail to respond to—the Basic Communitarian Cri-
tique? The “1p1v”mechanism for funding public goods holds some hints. In 1p1v, as in democratic gover-
nance, individuals vote on whether they value a public good, with each individual allowed to cast exactly
one vote, and then the public good is funded entirely through taxes and transfers. This mechanism still
contains an important dose of liberal spirit in that it is procedurally neutral. There is nothing in the
procedure that prevents individuals from expressing, via a referendum, whether they value the good in
question.
And yet, 1p1v is suboptimal from an efficiency standpoint, as we saw, because the median is often a
poor approximation for themean. Thus, 1p1vmay lead to overfunding or underfunding of a public good.
But one thing is certain: 1p1v is systematically biased against public goods valued by a small minority
community. The suboptimality of 1p1v is thus a formal analogue of the worries about the protection of
minorities that plagued the framers of the U.S. constitution, and of the idea that tyranny of the majority
is an inevitability for democracy. Tocqueville’s fears for community life under democracy are another clear
example.
So, just as democracy goes part of the way toward resolving the Basic Communitarian Critique but
introduces a new set of issues around the suppression of minority groups, 1p1v has advantages over the
Capitalist mechanism, and yet presents problems of its own. What is clear in both systems is that lib-
eralism struggles to protect minority communities. Capitalism underfunds all communities, while 1p1v
suppresses minority voices. While it is far older, and shows up clearly in Tocqueville, for resonance with
contemporary debates we call this criticism the Multiculturalist Critique.
The Multiculturalist Critique: Standard demoracy leads to systematic biases against minor-
ity groups and communities.
Again we can understand the Multiculturalist Critique in terms of the three fundamental desiderata:
there is noway to haveD1, D2 andD3 all at once. Democracieswithin liberalismdo a poor job of securing
D3, and further, it is unclearwhat sort of system compatible withD1 andD2 could genuinely achieveD3.
The Multiculturalist Critique is echoed in analyses of liberalism and democracy like Tocqueville’s,
but has been especially central to the thought of contemporary communitarians’ work. Charles Taylor
(1994) and IrisMarion Young (2000), for example, find majoritarian democracy lacking precisely because
of the potential for suppression of minority communities by forcing every citizen to choose between a
single hegemonic national community and atomization.
1p1v democracy is a blunt tool for resolving the competing demands of factions and subgroups of
a citizenry. At best, it goes part of the way toward resolving the deep central tension of liberalism. At
worst, it is fundamentally illiberal, allowing for no diversity among communities. If some semblance
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of liberalism is to be rescued under democracy, it will require the granting of basic rights to individu-
als and communities, which is difficult (if not impossible) to do in a neutral way. Capitalism raises the
Basic Communitarian Critique. While 1p1v responds to the Basic Communitarian Critique, it raises the
Multiculturalist Critique.
7.4 A history of Liberal Radicalism
TheLRmechanism, with its formal advantages overCapitalism and 1p1v, answers accordingly to both the
Basic Communitarian andMulticulturalist Critiques. We showed formally that LR is the optimal mech-
anism. It allows for the funding of public goods valued in small communities, thus it is not systematically
biased against minority interests. It also maintains neutrality among competing interests.
Consequently, Liberal Radicalism, a political philosophy based in the LR mechanism, resolves an
important aspect of the abiding disagreement between liberals and communitarians. Our formal analysis
is grounded in positions advanced by liberal thinkers who were attentive to communitarian concerns
throughout the history of liberalism. Notably, Tocqueville’s political theory, stemming from his own
resolution of the frictions he observed between liberalism anddemocracy, is a historical precedent for LR.
Tocqueville argued that localized collective organization is necessary, but if society becomes so localized
so as to be atomistic, liberal resistance to central authority is impossible. Similar ideas were also advanced
by later liberal thinkers, notably Henry George, Beatrice and SidneyWebb and Hannah Arendt.
The name “radicalism” is particularly associated with these first two and “radical” parties such as the
Danish Radikale Venstre and the various Radical parties led by Georges Clemenceau in France, as well as
the “new Liberal” party of David Lloyd George in England, drew much of their inspiration from these
ideas. George and the Webbs, writing in response to rise of industrialism, both advanced reforms that
align with our presentation of Liberal Radicalism. George (1879) held that the agglomeration and com-
munity necessary for cities and commerce, ignored by previous economists, had been perverted by indi-
vidualism as a basis formarket power and rents that fueled inequality and held resources away from their
best uses. He argued that these rents from communities belonged to these communities collectively and
ought to be taxed in order to fund community-oriented public goods, an idea which is encapsulated by
his eponymous theorem discussed in §5.5. The resonance with and direct relevance to LR is clear.
The Webbs (1897) applied similar insights to the agglomerations of business capital that, because of
economies of scale, could not simply be broken up as antitrust authorities in the US (inspired byGeorge)
attempted. They argued that corporations were the collective creations of networks of association and
cooperation among their workers and that the fruits of these communities were wastefully captured and
dominated by the capitalist financiers of these enterprises. They argued for “industrial democracy” in
which labor unions and other democratically-governed overlapping intermediary organizations would
help check and channel the power of corporate interests. Such an ecosystem draws on Tocqueville’s in-
sights about the importance of community to liberalism while connecting it to industrial society and is
precisely the sort of ecosystem LR seeks to foster.
Arendt (1951) picked up most directly Tocqueville’s ideas. She applied Tocqueville’s criticisms to the
extreme capitalism and unchecked democracy of the interwar period, arguing that the rise of totalitari-
anismwas a result of excessive atomization that left the national democratic community as the only basis
for collective organization. Atomized individuals desperate for community and left by liberalism only
with a national state as a locus for it, embraced the unmediated and unlimited connection to the state
that totalitarianism offered. Capitalism and democracy thus, without further layers of organization, led
to their opposite.
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Contemporary liberal thinkers have tried to respond to the challenges of multiculturalism and iden-
tity politics in a similar spirit. For example, both in his scholarly work (2005) and in his more popular
writing (2006), Kwame Anthony Appiah has sought to build a liberal philosophy that is deeply engaged
with the richness of human identity and community and yet which resists essentialist or eternal claims of
such groups to allow for a liberal, free-flowing and evolving definition of identities that serve individuals.
It is precisely this spirit that LR is intended tomanifest and it was a class on these books that inspired one
of us to first engage with these questions, hence the dedication with which we begin this piece.
7.5 Liberal Radicalism v. Liberal Individualism
Our analysis can be seen as attempt to mathematically formalize these streams of thoughts, offering a
framework for a novel solution. The LR mechanism thus guides us toward a new resolution of as-
pects the liberal-communitarian debate. In order to further articulate our intervention on the liberal-
communitarian debate, weposeLRagainstwhatwe call Liberal Individualism (LI), illustrating the philo-
sophical merits of the former through a dialectic with the latter. We focus on LI as it is a well-represented
position in history and political philosophy, and perhaps even the dominant strand of liberal thought
underpinning modern liberal democracies.
The Liberal Individualist has a natural response to our formulation of the Basic Communitarian and
Multiculturalist Critiques. There is no feasible way to have neutrality across all competing conceptions
of the good, and thus they must choose a particular form of neutrality. As individualists, they value the
benefits that accrue to individuals above all else. Thus, if they cannot be neutral across all competing con-
ceptions, they can at least be neutral among atomized conceptions of the good. The Liberal Individualist
may propose a new desideratum to replace universalistic neutrality:
D2’ : Neutrality across atomistic conceptions of the good.
Let’s formulate this dialectic in terms of the three fundamental desiderata. The Liberal Individualist
wants D1 and D2. The communitarian charges the Liberal Individualist with ignoring D3, the need to
allow for the provision of public goods valued by communities, groups, and other non-atomistic units.
Since the provision of public goods valued in communities may be entailed in individuals own concep-
tions of the good, D1 sometimes entails D3. Thus Liberal Individualism is not internally consistent—it
fails on its own terms.
The critiques substantiatedby ourpublic goodsmodel suggest thatLI is not neutral across competing
conceptions of the good. LI fails to get D3, which may itself be entailed by D1. And thus the Liberal
Individualist cannot be neutral across all competing conceptions. The natural response is then to argue
that it is impossible to be neutral across all conceptions. So, the Liberal Individualists propose D2’ in
place of D2—neutrality across atomistic conceptions of the good.
Communitarian Critique of Individualism: D1 sometimes entailsD3 and the Liberal Indi-
vidualist cannot haveD1, D2 andD3 at the same time.
Liberal Individualist Response: There is no feasible way to have D1, D2 andD3 at the same
time, so we proposeD2’. We can haveD1, D2’ andD3 and that is the best we could possibly
do.
In the face of this Liberal Individualist response to the critiques, our analysis of the LR mechanism
serves as an existence proof, of sorts. LR provides a way to haveD1, D2 andD3—to allow for goods val-
ued in atomistic and non-atomistic units, while remaining substantively neutral about competing con-
ceptions of the good. The optimality of the LR mechanism demonstrates a feasible alternative to the
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standard solutions to public goods provision. The neutrality of LR stems from its allowing any set of
public goods to emerge that are proposed by citizens and its support for community arises from its non-
linear form that offsets the free rider problem at all levels of social organization—from relatively small
communities, to larger labor unions up to a nation state and even global governance. It supports com-
munity optimally while being neutral not just about the aims of communities, but even about the level
and form of their organization.
To summarize, we used the formal framework developed in preceding sections to substantiate the
communitarian critique. A possible Liberal Individualist response to this critique is that there is no fea-
sible way to get neutrality across all competing conceptions. Thus the Liberal Individualist has no choice
but to settle for neutrality across atomistic conceptions. We invalidate this Liberal Individualist response
to the communitarian critique by posing a feasible alternative: LR. LR offers a way of guaranteeingD1,
D2 andD3, as demonstrated through its optimality in the dynamic, self-organizing provision of public
goods.
There are two remaining responses to consider: one from liberals and one from communitarians. A
committed individualist—often called a “perfectionist” in political philosophy17—might argue that LR
is not an improvement over LI. In fact, such a committed individualist might contend that individuals
ought to strive toward more atomized than non-atomistic views of the good. Pursuit of atomized con-
ceptions of the good is the most thorough and maximal way to enhance autonomy.
While this extreme individualism view may be a valid criticism of LR (see Dagan, Forthcoming for
a rough articulation of this view), we find it largely implausible. Even extreme individualists tend to ac-
knowledge the value of some forms of social life such as family, religious groups, etc. Furthermore, even if
such an extreme individualist is willing to give up on all forms of efficacious community not supported by
capitalist monopolies or charity, they face deeper problems funding any good valued in groups, as illus-
trated by the failures of theCapitalistmechanism in the public goods problem. For example, perfectionist
liberals cannot support any public goods with economies of scale, such as public transit, without large
losses to efficiency and thus to the scope of freedom afforded to the citizens they seek to empower.
An interestingmanifestation of this tension in a somewhat more broadly-discussed setting is the par-
ticular form of egalitarian but nonetheless extreme individualism proposed by many advocates of Uni-
versal Basic Income (UBI), such as Van Parijs (1995). He argues that the central goal of a just society
should be to provide the maximum possible unconditional UBI to every citizen to maximize the effec-
tive freedom citizens have to determine their life course independent of the demand of their peers, an
ideal that many political scientists believe was important to Scandinavian conceptions of the welfare state
(Esping-Andersen, 1990).
Yet it is not only this freedom from work requirements that have made Scandinavian societies some-
thing of amodel. It is rather the strength of public good provision and community. While Scandinavians
may have the freedom to drop social ties and, as Van Parijs suggests, live a solitary life as a surfer, one of
the most striking aspects of life in Scandinavia is actually the strength of social bonds and the wide range
of public goods provided at every level of social organization. It is further remarkable how much of the
support for individuals comes though these collective institutions rather than direct cash payments. A
high UBI within an otherwise atomized capitalist society may be an ideal for extreme individualists of an
egalitarian bent, but it does not seem an adequate description of what people admire about models like
Scandinavia. Whilemore equally distributingwealth and income asUBIwouldmay be desirable, we find
recent proposals such as Van Parijs’s to offer thin visions of productive society.
17 For a classic articulation of perfectionist liberalism see Raz (1986) and for a critical summary see Nussbaum (2011).
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7.6 Liberal Radicalism v. Illiberal Communitarianism
Communitarians might also have remaining complaints against our LR. In particular, a communitarian
could argue that the neutrality we get in our conception still fails to be neutral in important ways. Our
concept of substantive neutrality is morally individualist and based on a preference-aggregating notion
of neutrality.
Responses from communitarians in this vein are valid in principle, but strike us as a bit hasty in prac-
tice. After all, we have little experience of what an LR society would look like in practice. It might con-
tinue to do violence of communitarians’ notion of community. Yet, given that most communitarians
have beenmostly critical and have not proposed an alternative scheme of social organization, it is hard to
know if this is the case or not. Clearly an LR society would be dramatically more conducive to a range
of collective endeavors than any presently existing society. It seems to us that it would be at least worth
seeing if such a society allayed many communitarian critiques before rejecting it outright.
Furthermore, many of the communitarians we have cited above, while critical of the atomization of
liberalism, are equally critical of nearly all the more community-oriented schemes and political move-
ments of recent times, especially various forms of ethnonationalism or state socialism that are on the rise
today. Without a clear alternative to LI or to these populist movements, it seems worth it for many of
them to consider whether the clear design of LR offers a way to satisfy their concerns without giving
succor to alternatives they fear more.
We have little, however, to say to communitarians more sympathetic to these authoritarian inclina-
tions, beyond the theoretical arguments about—and historical example of—the abuse of such power
that liberals, such as Acton (1887), have been offering for at least the last four hundred years. LR is in-
deed morally individualist in that it uses a individual welfare criterion to assess the benefits that accrue to
individuals. However, even this critique offers an opportunity to distinguish our morally individualist
stance from a structural individualist stance that marks most Liberal Individualists. Structural individ-
ualists fundamentally subscribe to a notion of private goods—goods can only accrue to one individual
or another and not several individuals at once. Our moral individualism allows for good to accrue to in-
dividuals as well as communities—public goods are truly public under our moral individualism. Thus,
another way of understanding our argument is that we have shown a way in which moral individualists
can support community-oriented structures.
7.7 The limits of Liberal Radicalism
Before proceeding to more general remarks, we reflect briefly on the aims, intentions, and limits of our
theory. LR, insofar as it solves the liberal-communitarian debate, is not a fully-articulated ideology but
rather a framework for further political theorizing. We have presented formal rules for designing neutral
societies that demand refinement and translation into othermodes of communication before guiding the
designs of actual institutions.
Up to this point, there is still room for liberals and communitarians alike to object to our resolution.
They may appreciate that the LR mechanism has valuable properties for distributing public goods, but
that appreciation may be decidedly casual, reaching no deeper than approval of capitalistic markets as
valuablemechanisms for the distribution of private goods. In the design of institutions based in LR, one
might argue, liberals and communitarians both would require that LR be subject to various constraints
that protect minority interests and communal values. And then, if such constraints are required, it is
unclear whether LR is really an improvement over any existing system that is also subject to a complex
set of constraints.
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A feature of our unusual methodology—using mechanism design to make an argument in politics
andphilosophy—is that it is difficult to distinguish between our use of themechanism in actual proposals
and in arguments demonstrating the virtues of particular philosophical positions. The LRmechanism is
amodel, butwhat is the precise role of themodel in designing, justifying, and explaining newproposals or
philosophical positions? This problem is not new in political philosophy. The tradition of formal strate-
gic reasoning in political philosophy—from the proto-game theory in Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s descrip-
tion of the Stag Hunt (Rousseau, 1755) and David Hume’s account of the Coordination Game (Hume,
1738–40), to John Rawls’ and David Gauthier’s use of then-nascent game theory explicitly or implicitly
in their justificatory methods (Rawls, 1971; Gauthier, 1986)—has long been met with confusion as well
as excitement.18 This problem is also not new for applied economists, who are criticized ad nauseam for
their reliance on models that stand in ambiguous relation to reality.19
We take this feature of our methodology to be simultaneously perilous and promising. Connecting
mechanism design more explicitly with political philosophy can help guide the powerful theoretical ap-
paratus presented here into its most socially valued uses. At the same time, the introduction of complex
justificatory tools that only a few experts can understand has its hazards. Indeed, as one of us has ar-
gued elsewhere that taking the theoretical justifications common in mechanism design too literally can
present major hazards in the design of social justice-oriented institutions (Hitzig, 2018). For this reason,
LR as a proposal and a political philosophy are both best seen as templates that require further refinement
through collaboration between mathematically-oriented social scientists, conceptually rigorous philoso-
phers, and practically oriented policymakers and entrepreneurs.
We believe LR is a powerfulmechanism, but demands collaboration between (to quoteKeynes again)
those who “understand symbols” and those who “speak in words,” in order to enable designers of our
institutions to “contemplate the particular in terms of the general and touch abstract and concrete in the
same flight of thought.” It is precisely to help stimulate this collaboration that we wrote this paper in the
multi-vocal way we warned of in our introduction. We identify particularly promising forms of collabo-
ration, as well as further obstacles and limitations of the proposals, in the conclusion which follows.
§8 Conclusion
The title of this paper and the name of our mechanism is at least a quintuple entendre. First, literally,
it describes the mechanism, which uses the radical (viz. square root) to create a liberal funding regime
for collective goods. Second, as we described in §7 above, our vision here is closely related to that of the
Radical liberal tradition and thus it is a direct historical-ideological reference. Third, it is radical in the
current common usage sense that it would fundamentally change the institutions of existing capitalism
and one-person-one-vote if it were implemented.
Yet, most importantly, it is a radical formof liberalism in two senseswith deep resonance in the history
of political thought. Aswe saw in the previous section, there has long been a tradition of “radical political
thought”, much of it in the communitarian or continental tradition, that critiques traditional liberalism
for ignoring the fundamentally social nature of human life. To a large extent, liberals have ignored or
18For an early discussion of the promise and potential hazards of game theoretic reasoning in political philosophy, which
foresaw much of the confusion to come, see Braithwaite (1955).
19The literature on abstraction in economic methodology is vast. For an overview of normative and epistemological issues
in economic modeling, see Hausman andMcPherson (1994). For relevant discussions of the role of models from mechanism
design, in particular, in designing real-world institutions, see (Alexandrova, 2006, 2008).
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elided such critiques and championed superficially liberal institutions like capitalism or 1p1v democracy
that sound neutral and anti-authoritarian but whose effects can be quite opposite in the world we actu-
ally live in, where many of these “radical” critiques hold. In such a world, such systems typically lead to
monopolies and the tyranny of majority groups.
Liberal Radicalism at its core is an attempt to take seriously these critiques and build a form of lib-
eralism that seeks to achieve liberal ends in a fundamentally social world. In this sense it is also “radical”
in the original meaning: it gets to the roots of what liberalism is about, in our account, namely an anti-
authoritarian commitment to neutrality across ways of living and valuing. It thus eschews superficially
liberal institutions that do not, given evident force of the radical critiques, achieve liberal goals. Further, it
enables a vision of a different social organization that plays out the fundamental ideas of liberalismmuch
more completely.
It is this last aspect that strikes us as the most exciting direction in the long-term for our ideas here.
So much of the liberal order at present is a rigid set of kludges designed to balance competing levels of
social organization in roughly theway that Liberal Radicalism aims to, butwithout nearly the fluidity the
Liberal Radical mechanism offers. Usually these attempts succeed for a period, but in the medium-term
end up themselves becoming authoritarian impediments to change. Consider:
1. The modern nation state was largely an outgrowth of liberal movements demanding some form
of self-determination, but ended up idolizing an organic vision of nationality that has become one
of the greatest enemies of liberalism.
2. Liberal governmental structures aimed at protectingminorities, from thebyzantine checks andbal-
ances of the American constitution to the bizarre religiously-apportioned power-sharing arrange-
ments in Lebanon, have to a surprising degree succeeded in keeping the peace, but have deeply
entrenched historical divisions by hard-coding them.
3. Geographical hierarchies of government (local, state, provincial, etc.) have been a powerful tool
for liberals to decentralize power, yet have themselves become oddly outdated and rigid structures
in aworld where collaboration is often organized by social networks, trade flows and cultural com-
munities rather than by physical space.
The greatest hope we hold out for Liberal Radicalism in the long-term is that it offers an alternative
to this awkward dance of capitalist atomization coupled with overlapping checks and balances among
various rigid levels of collective organization. By allowing and optimally encouraging existing commu-
nities to act together, it preserves the crucial role of collective action. Yet by avoiding any fixed role for
any predetermined organization, it allows fluid change and reformation of different social groupings as
societies evolve.
However, before it can hope to achieve such a lofty vision, far more thought, communication, ex-
perimentation, and organization will be necessary. We briefly conclude with some things we hope to see
along each of these dimensions in the coming years.
In the category of ideas and research, our treatment of the economic theory around the LR mecha-
nism was extremely superficial: its analysis is based on simplified assumptions of complete information;
there is significant room for improvement in the analysis of the financing mechanism and deficits’ influ-
ence on incentives; our discussion of collusion is superficial and our results on how to deter it are thin.
Moreover, we do not even touch distributive issues. More ambitiously, the vision we sketched about the
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relationshipof theHenryGeorgeTheorem to thepossibility of fundingLR throughefficiency-enhancing
taxes on decreasing returns activities is still very vague and should be examined in much greater detail.
Beyond economic theory, there are countless philosophical, sociological, design and political ques-
tions our discussion leaves open. How can LR reflect and respond to the feminist critique of capitalist
individualism and family hierarchy? How would LR change social attitudes, interactions and ethical
standards? What can be done to further defend it from attacks and hacks? What would political parties
and activist organization look like under LR?More broadly, would LR optimally encourage community
formation or would the norms and rules needed to avoid collusion inadvertently undermine important
communities? Is it possible to make wide publics largely unfamiliar with mathematics comfortable with
the LR mechanism?
It is on this last pointwhere the input of artists, communicators anddesignerswill bemost important.
LR is in some ways resonant with a wide range of familiar themes in the history of liberal politics. Yet its
formal structure and specific form will initially strike many as bizarre. Designing interfaces, helping the
public to “see” what a LR society might be like, educating citizens about how to effectively interact with
it, educating philanthropists about its uses and more will be critical to making it a pervasive part of the
consciousness of the public. Visual artists, game designers, journalists, filmmakers, science fiction authors
andmore have already started to play a critical role in this communication for otherRadicalMarkets ideas
(Posner andWeyl, 2018) and we expect that the ambition and novelty of the LR mechanism will inspire
more activity in this direction than any of the other, narrower ideas.
Building awareness and understanding of the ideas will, in turn, be a critical basis for and component
of activism and organizing aimed at policy change in the LR direction. A number of present political
alignments seem promising for coalescing social forces around these and related ideas. As liberals seek
to stave off the challenge of reactionary populist movements of the left and right, existing ideas seem
increasingly stale and there is growing dissatisfaction with the atomizing character of standard liberal
capitalism.
The social liberal tradition inEurope—exemplifiedby a variety of partieswithin theAlliance ofLiber-
als and Democrats for Europe, and especially the Scandinavian member parties and European Commis-
sioner for Competition Margarethe Vestager who hails from Denmark’s Radikale Venstre party—have
a particularly strong historical resonance with the ideas we develop here. Increasingly, these parties are
becoming the central alternative to the rise of populism. Yet similar issues have come to the fore in the
United States and Latin America, as liberal leaders confront the dual threats of ethnonationalism and
state socialism at home while seeking to articulate an alternative to the avowedly illiberal world-views es-
poused by increasingly authoritarian governments in China and Russia. Without a coherent response,
many fear that the next economic or international disruption could easily bring illiberal ideologies the
success they just missed in the 1930s and 1940s.
Yet while a global scale political response to the present crisis is much of whatmotivates us, we do not
expect it to be the first realm in which the LR will find application. Instead, we have laid out a variety
of narrower domains in which we anticipate experimentation in the near term. Such experimentation is
critical for a variety of reasons: to investigate the weaknesses of the formal mechanisms and address these
flaws with new designs, to acquaint people with their operation and build awareness of their value, to
build social institutions around them that make them effective, and to provide rigorous empirical evi-
dence of their value.
We expect and hope for a wide range of such experimentation around LR. The most likely first ap-
plication will be open source software communities, which are very open to experiments with new algo-
rithms, especially ones that change social dynamics; cryptocurrency communities seem particularly ap-
37
propriate. However, we are also hopeful that a variety of philanthropists, especially those thatmade their
money in the technology world, will seek to use such mechanisms to fund a wide range of activities cur-
rently covered by charities. TheOpen Philanthropy and “effective altruism”movements are based on the
idea that donor discretion should be removed to the extent possible from philanthropy. In areas where
randomized controlled trials and other precise measurements are insufficient to direct funds, LR seems
well-suited to this philosophy.
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